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PATENT "MONOPOLYPHOBIA": A
MEANS OF EXTINGUISHING THE
FOUNTAINHEAD?
Simone A. Roset
This Article analyzes whether patent property rights confer mo-
nopoly power or power overprice, being per se "monopolistic" in the
antitrust sense. Courts often assume that patent rights (unlike other
exclusive property rights) inherently confer the power to charge su-
pernormal prices. This results in a negative presumption surround-
ing patent rights, providing the impetus for courts to define narrowly
and sometimes stifle the promotion of these rights. The early patent
misuse cases (1930-1950) are replete with references to patents as
anticompetitive monopolies and illustrate how narrowly viewing the
patent right led to an increased likelihood of invalidating this right.
The latest battle over the survival of the doctrine of equivalents in
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.1 further sub-
stantiates the courts' struggle with defining and properly limiting
patent rights.
Preliminary statistical analysis also indicates that negative judi-
cial sentiment adversely affects patent filings and negatively impacts
economic growth. There is a correlation between the proportion of
patents adjudicated not invalid by appellate courts (validity adjudi-
cation), patent filings in the Patent and Trademark Office (patents
filed) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Within a few years fol-
lowing a cycle of judicial hostility, the number of patent applications
decreases. Negative judicial sentiment thus adversely affects patent
filings (.646 Pearson's, .66 rank correlation). Moreover, there is a
strong statistical relationship between patents filed and GDP (.887
Pearson's, .944 rank correlation).
These data powerfully suggest that patent rights provide incentives
t Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University; B.S.M.E. 1981, University of Penn-
sylvania; J.D. 1989, University of Maryland. I wish to expressly thank and acknowledge the
following friends, colleagues and research assistants who provided invaluable assistance with
this piece: Alan Palmitter, David Shores, Marion Benfield, Joel Newman, Timothy Davis, Rick
Harris, Ron Wright, Paul Ditz, Eric Kron, Marjorie Benbow and Matthew Lung.
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for inventors to research and develop new technologies, which in turn
strengthens the United States economically. Courts should therefore
more favorably view patents as property rights that seldom confer
power over price and thus are not inherently monopolistic. By view-
ing patent rights as property, we can create incentives to innovate,
thereby ensuring afountainhead for technological progress.
INTRODUCTION
Set up standards of achievement open to all, to the least, to
the most inept-and you stop the impetus to effort in all men,
great or small. You stop all incentive to improvement, to ex-
cellence, to perfection. Laugh at Roark and hold Peter
Keating as a great architect. You've destroyed architecture.2
Throughout the centuries there were men who took first steps
down new roads armed with nothing but their own vision
.... The great creators-the thinkers, the artists, the scien-
tists, the inventors-stood alone against the men of their
time. Every great new thought was opposed, every great
new invention denounced.... But the men of unborrowed
vision went ahead. They fought, they suffered and they paid.
3But they won.
In her first and most controversial novel The Fountainhead, Ayn
Rand follows the battle of architectural visionary Howard Roark, who
desperately seeks to thrive in a society that rewards mediocrity while
stifling creativity. Ellsworth Toohey, the novel's antagonist, sees the
reward of mediocrity and the stifling of the fountainhead of creative
genius as the sole means of achieving control and power over the
masses. 4 Toohey marginalizes Roark's creative genius by having new
architects substitute Gothic designs for Roark's modern design of
Cortland, a low-income housing project. In the end, the final product
bears little resemblance to Roark's original intellectual property.5
Roark responds by bombing Cortland and later stands trial for the
2 AYN RAND, THE FOUNTAINHEAD 665 (1968) (quoting Ellsworth Tooley, antagonist).
3 Id. at 710 (quoting Howard Roark, protagonist).
4 See id. at 579-99. Through the media, Toohey manages to convince society to reward and
applaud the most mediocre writers, artists, architects, etc. He places these people in positions of
power and then manipulates them for his own personal enjoyment, all while continuously
preaching the theme that all must be done for the good of the collective. Id.
5 Unlike the society depicted in THE FOUNTAINHEAD, federal copyright law in the United
States protects intellectual property, including architectural works. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1994) (including architectural works in definition of subject matter of copyright).
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demolition of government property.6 While Toohey fears creative
genius and the stimulation of free market competition, Roark estab-
lishes that the cornerstone of any great society is creativity. "This
creative faculty cannot be given or received.... That which it creates
is the property of the creator." 7 He warns that further marginalization
of an individual's creativity and right to reap the reward for her crea-
tivity will stifle the core of the individual, resulting in a slave society.8
The fears espoused in The Fountainhead were never realized and
we remain a capitalist society. Nevertheless, the novel's underlying
message concerning an individual's right to control and commercially
exploit her intellectual creation or "property" has an unsettling effect
on many. We presently reap the economic benefits of free market
competition and readily embrace and enforce real property rights.
Unfortunately, however, the intangible nature of intellectual property
triggers a reluctance to accept an individual's useful invention or
creative work as property. This Article is the second of a series that
evaluates whether intellectual property rights are best viewed as prop-
erty or monopoly.9
The overwhelming majorities of patents do not confer monopoly
power on the grantee, 10 but instead stimulate free market competition
by increasing the number of consumer options. Because alternatives
or substitutes are frequently available for the patented product, the
patentee will rarely be able to extract the type of pricing power that
creates a monopoly for her product. For example, if General Electric
patents and markets a new energy efficient AC motor, consumers can
6 See RAND, supra note 2, at 685 ("My act of loyalty to every creator who ever lived and
was made to suffer by the force responsible for the Cortland [housing project] I dynamited. To
every tortured hour of loneliness, denial, frustration, abuse he was made to spend-and to the
battles he won. To every creator whose name is known-and to every creator who lived, strug-
gled and perished unrecognized before he could achieve. To every creator who was destroyed
in body or spirit.").
7 See id. at 711.
8 See id. at 706-18.
9 Simone A. Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protection For 'Famous' Trademarks: Anti-
Competitive 'Monopoly' or Earned 'Property' Right, 47 FLA L. REv. 653 (1995). The first
article set in the context of Rand's second novel ATLAS SHRUGGED, traced the origination of the
term "monopoly" as an economically neutral term to define an exclusive right and established
that courts fail to refer to intellectual property as economically neutral monopolies. Instead,
courts use the term "monopoly" in the antitrust sense to imply that the granting of such rights
automatically confers market power on the grantee and impedes free market competition. The
first article focused on how this "monopolyphobia" invaded trademark law and inhibited a fair
and expansive application of the Lanham Act and dilution doctrine.
1o See Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 914 n.25 (6th Cir. 1978) (concluding that a patent
"rarely enjoys a dominant share in the relevant market. ... [because] the patent is limited to a
unique form or improvement of the product and the economic power resulting from the patent
privileges is slight") (citing Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1958)).
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choose to pay a slight premium for motors that conserve power, or
remain with the older, equally reliable design.'
Moreover, because the patentee has to publicly disclose her inven-
tion to obtain the patent, she has contributed another building block
for other inventors to design around, develop and market their own
novel inventions as improvements on the patented product.' 2  Thus,
GE's competitors are motivated to invent and manufacture their own
lines of energy-efficient motors. This further enhances free market
competition, thereby reducing the likelihood of the patentee possess-
ing monopoly or market power. 13
The Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property
state that "[t]he Agencies will not presume that a patent, copyright, or
trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner."'
14
Nonetheless, courts continue to get it wrong. This is partially the
fault of intellectual property lawyers and scholars who loosely use the
term "monopoly," often in the pejorative antitrust sense. Thus, the
judiciary neglects to recognize that patents stimulate technological
innovation and economic growth, while characterizing patents as an-
titrust monopolies that stunt economic growth and free market com-
petition.
"See Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-78
(1965). The Court noted:
To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a part of a trade or commerce
under § 2 of the Sherman Act, it would then be necessary to appraise the exclusion-
ary power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the relevant market for the product
involved. Without a definition of that market there is no way to measure... [the
patentee's] ability to lessen or destroy competition. It may be that the ... [pat-
ented] device does not comprise a relevant market. There may be effective substi-
tutes for the device, which do not infringe the patent.
Id. (emphasis added); see also DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 58
(1998) (arguing that as long as effective substitutes are available the patent will not create mo-
nopoly power). Chisum explains:
For example, people will only buy better mousetraps if they cost less than cats....
The more substitutes there are for the patented product, the more horizontal will be
the patentee's demand curve, and the closer will be her marginal revenue curve to
her demand, and the smaller will be the dead weight loss she creates.
Id.
12 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 869 (1990) (cautioning against the over-broadening of patent scope
since subsequent inventions may not serve as substitutes for the patented invention but improve
or build upon it in some way, resulting "in something not simply slightly different but signifi-
cantly better than the patented technology").
13 Cf. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1531 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Newman, J., concurring) ("The analytic complexity with respect to the doctrine of
equivalents arises because technologic growth benefits not only from the activities of the origi-
nators, but also from those who improve, enlarge and challenge.").
14 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY § 2.2 (1995) [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDELINES].
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This Article focuses on patent law, the source of intellectual prop-
erty "monopolyphobia." I explain in Part I why patents are best char-
acterized as property rather than monopolies. Although patents are
technically both property and monopolies, 15 the term "monopoly" is
frequently used in a pejorative antitrust context and creates an impli-
cation of harm to the public. Conversely, the term "property" creates
an implication of an earned right to use and exclude without impeding
free market competition. Thus, viewing patents as property leads to a
positive, more balanced evaluation of the patent right.
In Part II, I provide an empirical demonstration of how patents
positively impact the economy. I begin by tracing the various cycles
of judicial hostility demonstrated by appellate courts. I analyze select
Supreme Court cases from each judicial cycle to illustrate that patents
were frequently labeled property when favored by the court and la-
beled anticompetitive monopolies during cycles of judicial hostility.16
I analyze the recent conflict over the doctrine of equivalents ("DOE")
which illustrates that patent "monopolyphobia" continues to permeate
patent infringement cases and threaten technological innovation and
economic growth.' 7
15 By legal definition, "property" and "monopoly" are both rights to exclude. The patentee
has the right to exclude others from making, using or selling for the term of the patent. Thus,
this right squarely fits both definitions. See Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith
Co., 329 U.S. 637, 641 (1947) ("'The owner of all property, by withholding it upon any other
terms, may, if he can, force others to buy from him; land is the best example and every parcel of
land is a monopoly."') (quoting Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 156
F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1946)); Consolidated Fruit-Jars Mach. Corp. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96
(1876) ("A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. The right rests on
the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions."); In re Etter, 756
F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The patent right is a right to exclude.... The essence of all
property is the right to exclude, and the patent property right is certainly not inconsequential.");
Schenk, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F. 2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The right to exclude
others is the very definition of 'property."'); see also Hon. Giles S. Rich, Foreword, in CHISUM
ET AL., supra note 11, at iv ("Property rights in general are a form of monopoly. It is simple
power that can be put to either good or bad uses. The patent system puts it to good use as an
incentive to innovation.").
16 Patents are also labeled monopolies during cycles of judicial favor. However, in these
cases the term "monopoly" is not used in a pejorative manner, implying that the patent right is
per se anticompetitive. Instead, these courts use the term "monopoly" in an economically neu-
tral sense merely to indicate that the patent right provides a limited right to exclude. In fact,
these cases often use the terms "property" and "monopoly" interchangeably. See, e.g., Conti-
nental Paper Bag v. Eastern Paper, 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) (referring to patents as economi-
cally beneficial monopolies as "his absolute property").
17 1 concede that the creation of the Federal Circuit has led to far less "monopolyphobia"
than in earlier judicial cycles of hostility. Some scholars have gone so far as to characterize the
Federal Circuit as pro-patent. See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUrr
684-740 (3d ed. 1994) (reviewing the Federal Circuit's practice in relation to patents); see also
Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit's Patent Decisions: 1982-
1994, 5 FED. CR. BJ. 151, 155 (1995) (noting that federal courts are likely to uphold patent
infringement cases). The present controversy concerning the doctrine of equivalents is equally
driven by the tension between equitably expanding claims beyond their literal language and the
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Part II concludes by evaluating the relationship between the per-
centage of patents adjudicated valid by appellate courts, the numbers
of patents filed in the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") and
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Although other scholars have ana-
lyzed the relationship between patent procurement and GDP,18 this
paper is the first to evaluate empirically the impact on innovation and
economic growth of judicial attitudes toward patents. Because of the
various components comprising GDP, it is difficult to substantiate a
strong statistical correlation between patents adjudicated and GDP.
There is, however, a direct correlation between patents adjudicated
and patents filed, and a strong statistical correlation between patents
filed and GDP. Thus, we observe that within a short time following a
cycle of hostility, the number of patent applications decreased, which
ultimately led to a decrease in technological innovation, negatively
impacting our economy. 19 Conversely, when appellate courts favored
patents, the number of patent applications increased, which then posi-
tively impacted our economy.20
notice function of the disclosure requirements of section 112 of the Patent Act. In its first and
second paragraphs, section 112 provides four distinct disclosure requirements: 1) a written
description, 2) a disclosure enabling one "skilled in the art to which it pertains" to duplicate the
invention, 3) disclosure of the "best mode," and 4) a set of claims "particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. §
112 (1994); see also London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(interpreting section 112 as mandating patentees to give the public "fair notice of what the
patentee and the Patent and Trademark Office have agreed constitute the metes and bounds of
the claimed invention").
I believe, however, that while the Federal Circuit and patent scholars appreciate the section
112 notice/equivalence tension, others (e.g., general litigators and district courts) may not.
Thus, it remains timely to warn of "monopolyphobia" in the DOE context and encourage courts
to evaluate patents as property, rather than as anticompetitive monopolies. Because of the am-
biguities surrounding the term "monopoly" and the potential for a distorted evaluation of the
patent right, we may avoid this term and simply refer to patents as property. Indeed, there is
nothing in the Patent Act labeling patents monopolies. Instead, section 261 notes that patents
possess the "attributes of property." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
18 See generally Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT.
Sa. 173 (1986) (concluding that patent procurement increased the rate of innovation for indus-
tries such as pharmaceuticals and chemicals, which rely primarily on patents for intellectual
property protection); Francis Narin et al., What Patents Tell You About Your Competition,
CHEMTECH, Feb. 1993, at 52 (noting the economic necessity of patents for technological and
business growth).
19 The basic statistics used to cross-reference gross domestic product fail to provide conclu-
sive evidence concerning the degree that patent procurement positively or negatively effects the
economy. However, I do believe that the data indicates a trend, which should encourage
economists to delve further into this area. A more concrete study should contrast patent pro-
curement by industry versus gross domestic product by industry. Unfortunately, we lacked the
resources to attempt to categorize the cases by industry and contrast this with the economic data.
This will be the subject of a future piece focusing on the pharmaceutical and biotechnological
industries.
For an explanation of the statistical factors used, see infra notes 202 and 213.
20 Of course, GDP may drive the analysis: namely, a stronger economy may stimulate pat-
ent filings. We are then left with the dilemma of which came first, the chicken or the egg. At a
[Vol. 49:509
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In Part IIT, I recommend amending the Patent Act to include lan-
guage clarifying that patents are property.21 The proposed amend-
ments include codifying the doctrine of equivalents to give Congres-
sional emphasis on treating patents as property and equitably extend-
ing this concept of property beyond the literal language of the claim.22
Viewing patents as property motivates the Supreme Court, Federal
Circuit and district courts to conduct an equitable, balanced evalua-
tion of these rights. This enhances the synergistic relationship be-
tween patents and industrial growth, thereby ensuring that we remain
a fountainhead of technological innovation in an era of ever-
increasing global competition.
I. PATENTS ARE PROPERTY
The term monopoly connotes the giving of an exclusive
privilege for buying, selling, working or using a thing which
the public freely enjoyed prior to the grant. Thus a monop-
oly takes something from the people. An inventor deprives
the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery,
but gives something of value to the community by adding to
the sum of human knowledge. 3
[O]wnership of patents is no different than the ownership of
any other property right necessary as an input, and ... we
minimum, our preliminary analysis establishes that there is a synergy between these three fac-
tors. As a result, to avoid creating negative synergy, courts should objectively and positively
view patents as property.
2 Section 261 of the Patent Act presently states that "patents shall have the attributes of
personal property." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994). I posit that this language lacks the strength of
stating that "patents are property" and is also buried in the Act and easily missed by the lay
person. I propose defining patents as property earlier in the Act, perhaps in section 101, which
maps out patentable subject matter.
22 For a description of the doctrine of equivalents, see infra note 138 and accompanying
text. I hope, perhaps naively, that codifying the DOE will also lead to a more consistent
evaluation of how to draw effective boundaries around a patentee's right based on what she has
claimed, disclosed in her invention and stated during prosecution. I agree with Merges and
Nelson that the DOE should not be manipulated by pro-patent courts to inequitably broaden the
patent right, because granting patents of overly broad scope, in particular for pioneering patents,
inhibits rather than stimulates innovation. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 12, at 916 (noting
that "any reduction in patent scope or lessening of the patentee's potential reward may severely
undercut the incentive to invent," but for pioneering inventions we must carefully apply the
DOE to avoid "diminish[ing] incentives for others to stay in the invention game").
Part Ill of this piece includes a discussion of factors to be considered when evaluating the
DOE, in order to help maintain a proper evaluation of patents as property, while preserving the
patent's notice function and incentive to innovate. I acknowledge the tension between the DOE
and section 112's notice requirements. I agree that the doctrine can not be used to undermine
section 112's provisions that the patent specification and claims define the patent property
boundaries as well as what remains in the public domain.
23 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (citation omitted).
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should no more assume that the owner of a patent is a mo-
nopolist than we should assume that the owner of particu-
larly fertile land, especially productive skills, or of an ad-
vantageous location is a monopolist.24
"Property," like the term "monopoly" in its economically neutral
sense, means no more than a granting of a right to exclude.2 The
patent right excludes others from making, using or selling the claimed
invention for the term of twenty years after the filing date of the pat-
ent application. 26 This squarely fits the definition of property. In-
deed, section 261 of the Patent Act expressly refers to patents as
having the "attributes of personal property. ' ' 7 Nowhere in the Patent
Act is the patent right described as an anticompetitive monopoly. So
the question becomes, how did the courts get it wrong?
One answer is that conceptualizing intellectual property as prop-
erty in the literal sense is difficult and troublesome. Intellectual prop-
erty is generated by the mind, incorporeal in nature and thus difficult
to grasp as something that is earned by its creator. Also, for patents
and other forms of intellectual property, the creator has used ideas
and principles from the public domain to develop her invention,
thereby triggering an instinctual reaction against allowing such crea-
tions to become the exclusive right or property of the creator. This
tension is illustrated in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitu-
tion, which gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors, the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries." 28 Indeed, the scope and terms of protection outlined in the
patent, copyright and trademark acts29 evidence a balance between the
creator's property rights and the public's right to freely utilize ideas to
develop additional creative works. During whatever period Congress
24 Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 31, 33
(1986).
2 See, e.g., In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also CHISUM ET AL,
supra note 11, at 5 (distinguishing patent and copyright property from real property because
patent property rights are limited to the right to exclude, while real property rights confer the
right to use "that carries with it a logically subordinate right to exclude .... to ensure the
owner's full enjoyment of the right to use").
26 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994) (measuring from the filing date of the application, a patent
term is twenty years).
27 Id. § 261 (1998); see also JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES § 1.03 (1996) ("The most direct way of avoiding waste due to external benefits is
giving the producer of the benefit the legal benefit the right to exclude others from obtaining or
using it. This is the essence of what all property rights do.").
U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8.
29 Unlike the Patent and Copyright Acts, Congress's power to enact federal trademark law
is derived from the Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
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chooses for the limited time, presently twenty years from the date of
application for patents, the inventor has a constitutionally mandated
property right to exclusive use of her invention.
30
Another answer is the psychological difficulty of categorizing
anything intangible as property.31 Psychologically, our ability to
touch, feel and observe land development makes us comfortable cre-
ating legally enforceable real property rights that are everlasting in
duration. The same is true for tangible forms of personal property,
such as cars and equipment, which are protected by an elaborate net-
work of common and statutory personal property law.32 Conversely,
we can not touch or feel the inventive process of creating intellectual
property, and consequently struggle with defining and protecting
these rights. Thus, when inventors attempt to enforce patent rights in
court, many judges refuse to evaluate patents as property.33 Instead,
courts often erroneously view patents as monopolies in the pejorative
antitrust sense, presuming that the granting of patent rights automati-
cally confers market power34 on the grantee that inhibits free market
,30 The limited duration of the patent right, unlike real property rights, probably makes it
more attractive to the term "monopoly." Limiting the duration does imply that during that pe-
riod something is being taken away from the public, which is ultimately returned, thereby re-
storing free market competition. Considering the requirements of novelty and non-obviousness
for patents, the better view is that the patentee has contributed new property to society and thus
enhances, rather than detracts from, free market competition, even during the patent term.
31 Sehlicher points out that this problem can also be termed the problem of public goods.
"A public good arises when the nature of the good requires that, to satisfy the demand of one
consumer, (1) someone must produce a unit of a good which is capable of satisfying the de-
mands of all other consumers without additional use of resources, and (2) that good will be
available to all consumers if it is made available to one." SCHLICHER, supra note 27, § 2.08; see
also CHISUM ET AL., supra note 11, at 58 ("The inventor's paradox is due largely to certain
features that are shared by all forms of information in general. Information is a special type of
economic good, often called a public good, as distinct from so-called private goods. Public
goods have two characteristics. They are non-rival (i.e., inexhaustible) and non-exclusive.").32 See, e.g., U.C.C. art. 9 (1995). Adopted by all 50 states, UCC Article 9 protects security
interests in various types of personal property, including intellectual property. States also pro-
tect personal property under common law schemes such as conversion.
33 Today, some judges readily point out the positive aspects of patents as property which
stimulate innovation. See, e.g., Rich, supra note 15, at iv. Also, Judge Markey, former Chief
Judge of the Federal Circuit, criticized labeling patents as anticompetitive monopolies. He
acknowledges that "others, particularly those charged with infringement, have long employed
the phrase monopoly pejoratively." Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 914 n.25 (6th Cir. 1978).
Once again, I caution against assuming that the monopoly/property dichotomy understood
by patent scholars and judges with patent backgrounds extends to general litigators and district
court judges. Thus, many modem opinions (particularly those issued before formation of the
Federal Circuit) and legal briefs still refer to patents as monopolies in the pejorative sense. See,
e.g., Ashcroft Paper v. Paper Mate Mfg., 434 F.2d 910, 912 (9th Cir. 1970) (arguing that the
monopoly effect of patents has led courts to set a "high and exacting standard for patent valid-
ity"); see also SCHLICHER, supra note 27, § 2.18 (noting that courts abandoned the patents-as-
property theory and moved to viewing patents as economic monopolies).
3 Diane Brinson, in a well-written article analyzing the intersection of intellectual property
and antitrust law, points out that courts interchangeably use the terms "monopoly power,"
"market power" and "economic power." J. Diane Brinson, Proof of Economic Power in a
1999]
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competition. Consequently, many attempts to enforce patent rights
are met with judicial hostility, leading to inconsistent evaluations of
both literal patent infringement and infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents.
Market power is defined as a seller's capability to exert power
over price; in other words, it is "the ability of a firm to raise prices
above the competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidly
that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded." 35 The
term market power is synonymous with economic power and monop-
oly power. Basically, a seller possessing such power enters the mar-
ket and commands a premium price for its product above existing
competition. The normal market forces for that product are disrupted
for the period that the seller maintains the monopoly. Unlike the pat-
ent right, monopoly power inhibits free market competition and is
evidenced by a negatively sloping demand curve,36 the social losses
of allocative and productive inefficiency, dead weight loss of com-
petitive pricing, and loss of consumer pricing power.37
As mentioned above, the patent right confers the right to exclude
others from making, using or selling the patented invention for the
statutory period of twenty years.38 Arguably, granting such a right
inherently gives the seller some unique capability to dominate the
market or control pricing at a competitive disadvantage during the
term of the patent. In reality, the majority of patents are not commer-
cialized. Those that are commercialized derive their value from a
series of complementary factors such as manufacturing and distribu-
tion facilities, workforces, advertising and other items of intellectual
property.39 Thus, the patent right itself does not confer market power
Sherman Act Tying Arrangement Case: Should Economic Power Be Presumed when the Tying
Product Is Patented or Copyrighted?, 48 LA. L. REV. 29, 36 (1987) (citations omitted).
35 Id.
36 With monopolies, as the price of goods drops consumer demand increases, thereby re-
sulting in a downward sloping demand curve. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 11, at 54. In a
competitive market, market forces control or cap the price any given consumer will spend on a
product. See id. at 55. Thus, each competitive firm faces a horizontal demand curve indicating a
constant price, independent of the quantity produced by that firm. See id. In a monopoly, nei-
ther price nor demand is fixed. See id. at 56. The monopolist controls total market demand as
evidenced by a downward sloping demand function. See id.
37 Although patents and all types of property rights fit the economically neutral definition of
"monopoly" which is merely a right to exclude, the meaning of "monopoly" as used by courts
and economists is the condition that creates market power or generates social loss. This condi-
tion is present only when the demand curve has a negative slope in the region at which output is
occurring.
38 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
39 See, e.g., ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 2.3 ("Intellectual property typically is
one component among many in a production process and derives value from its combination
with complementary factors."); see also Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of
Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 250 (1994) (noting that "in the great bulk of instances no
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or power over price. One must concede, however, that commercial-
ized patents can have an impact on a particular market and may, for
certain pioneering inventions, confer market power.4° Even in these
rare instances, however, the patent's value, in filling a societal need
and in the statutory disclosure requirements that enable others to in-
vent additional pioneering devices, outweighs the effects of such mo-
nopoly power.4'
For example, many commercialized inventions were the first to fill
a perceived societal need. Pioneering inventions such as the light
bulb, telephone or latest generation antibiotic enabled their respective
patentees to exert more power over pricing than in cases where sub-
stitutes were readily available. Even here however, the patentee's
market power or power over price is not created by the patent grant
itself, but by society's demand and/or need for this unique product
and its ultimate commercialization. To fulfill this need and bring a
product to market a manufacturer must establish a distribution net-
work, assemble a workforce, select a trademark for source identifica-
tion and quality assurance, and advertise. It is the combination of the
significant market power is granted [from the patent right]. We must bear in mind that leading
companies may obtain 1,000 or more patents in a single year, and yet many such firms are un-
likely ever to obtain even a single monopoly in any market') (citing Wesley M. Cohen & Rich-
ard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structures, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1059, 1062-64 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,
1989)).
This statement may lead one to question the importance of patents to technological progress
since many are never commercialized. I posit that patents remain significant to technological
progress for a variety of reasons. First, they create an incentive to innovate. Even if Company
X chooses not to commercialize certain patents in its portfolio, it continues to work on addi-
tional inventions that will create profits for itself. Also, because of the public disclosure re-
quirement, Company Y may use X's non-commercialized patent as a building block for its own
novel product, which it may choose to commercialize, thereby stimulating economic growth.
See, e.g., Edmund W. Kiteh, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265 (1977) (arguing that the patent right creates the incentive to prospect and develop more
devices that enhance economic growth); see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 12, at 875 (cit-
ing Kitch's prospect theory of patents but also noting that "[p]roperty rights that are too narrow
will not provide enough incentive to develop the asset, while overly broad rights will preempt
too many competitive development efforts. Kitch's prospect theory must be supplemented to
take account of this important limitation on the breadth of property rights").
40 See Kiteh, supra note 24, at 37-38 ("A patent can have value like any input that gives a
firm a comparative advantage over its competitors, but that does not mean that the owner of the
patent owns a monopoly."); see also infra note 55 and accompanying text.
41 The Patent Act's disclosure provision requires a writing, which includes the best mode of
producing the claimed invention, along with a set of claims that along with the specification
defines and notifies the public of the metes and bounds of the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1994); see also Kitch, supra note 39, at 286 ("Pursuit of these speculations may clarify the
process and conditions under which a monopolist industry will be more efficient than a com-
petitive one."); Merges & Nelson, supra note 12, at 908-09 (proposing that the Patent and
Trademark Office could avoid harmful effects of granting patents in pioneering areas by limit-
ing unduly broad patents).
1999]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW
patent right and these complementary factors that give the product
value and determine its competitive role in the marketplace.42
Nonetheless, once the patent property right is commercialized it
can be misused by the patentee to create an unlawful monopoly that
impedes free market competition. 43 For example, suppose Corpora-
tion X misuses its patent rights by tying the sale of its patented salt
machine to the purchase of salt, an unpatented product. Corporation
X may lose its patent on the salt machine and face liability under fed-
eral antitrust law if it is proven that this tying conferred market power
on Corporation X in the salt industry.44 It is the unlawful vertical and
horizontal pricing arrangements among competitors and patent misuse
that violated federal antitrust law, not the use of the patent right it-
self.45  As aptly noted by Judge Markey in Nickola v. Peterson,
46
"[a]bsent demand for product.., there can be no commercial success.
... [and] [n]o patent can itself create market demand." 47
Generally, a seller's market power is limited by the consumer's
ability to choose an alternative or substitute for the patented product.
For example, if our inventor commercializes her patented lightweight,
energy-efficient iron, consumers can choose to purchase her techni-
cally superior iron or a cheaper iron with more familiar features.
Consumer choice thus inhibits the inventor's ability to exert monop-
oly pricing power. This is particularly true when the inventor is first
marketing her device. Consumers often want others to test the waters
regarding a new product, thereby giving the older and arguably obso-
42 See ANTTRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 2.3.
43 Patent misuse is broadly defined to include any attempt by the patentee "to expand the
granted scope or to use the patent as leverage to take advantage outside the scope of the grant is
referred to as patent misuse, regardless of whether there is a substantial lessening of competition
or other effects necessary to a finding of an antitrust violation." Donald Rupert, The Relation-
ship of Patent Law to Antitrust Law, 49 ANTrIRUST LJ. 755, 757 (1980). The two types of
patent misuse that rise to the level of antitrust violations are: 1) the improper tying of a patent
under license to the purchase of an unpatented item and 2) the use of the patent to control or
restrict market prices. See id.
4See generally Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994); Clayton Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)
(1994). Indeed, the hypothetical recites the facts of the two seminal patent misuse and antitrust
cases International Salt v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) and Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger
Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). In both cases, the patentees were held to have violated antitrust laws
and have misused their patents by the tying arrangement of the salt machines to the purchase of
the patentee's brand of salt. Both cases are criticized by commentators, however, because it
was unlikely that either patentee could have gained true market power or power over price in the
salt market by having one vendor buy its particular product. There was too much salt available
and purchased by others for a negative demand curve to be created in either instance.
41 See Rupert, supra note 43, at 755, 758; see also Kitch, supra note 24, at 39-40 (arguing
that courts generally ignored the question of whether patents created monopolies and instead
focused on whether the contractual tying agreements violated the antitrust laws).
46 580 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1978).47 1d. at 914.
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lete version of the product significant market power. 48 To remain
competitive, the inventor must price her iron to reflect the market
power of the older products, thereby negating her ability to procure
monopoly profits.49 Also, toward the end of my hypothetical patent
term, the inventor must invest significant profits in further research
and development to compete with new technology that may displace
her patented process. Although the inventor's patent provides some
competitive advantage, since she can temporarily exclude others from
copying the device, it does not confer true market power °.5  In fact,
the inventor can only occupy the iron market if she prices her iron at
"a level which identifies and develops the market that exists at price
levels close to cost." 51 Thus, the patent right itself can not produce
the monopoly profits or dead weight loss that are the trademark social
costs of monopolies.
In most cases, the patent right actually enhances product efficiency
without creating excessive pricing power. For example, providing an
enabling disclosure for the latest generation antibiotic patent enables
competitors to use this information as building blocks to develop and
patent stronger, more effective antibiotics. This prevents any single
patentee from gaining monopoly power from its patent portfolio. 52
4 8 See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 24, at 34. Kitch states:
[I]t is the rare invention indeed which immediately sweeps aside its predecessors.
Transistors did not displace vacuum tubes overnight, word processors did not imme-
diately eliminate typewriters. The reason is that there are substantial investment
commitments to the old technology. These are not only in special purpose machinery,
whose economic value may have fallen to zero, but also investments in specialized
human capital which can be used only with the old technology. For the user, the cost
of new technology is not only the price, but also the investment required to enable
him or his personnel to make use of it.
ItL
49 See id. at 38-39 ("Although the technology being displaced may be 'obsolete' in an engi-
neering sense, it will often remain as a competitive force for many years, and be priced to reflect
the obsolescence of the specialized resources dedicated to its production and use.").50 See id. at 39. As Kitch describes:
Then as the patented technology begins to dominate the market, the patent owner
must consider the coming end of the patent term, and the ever present possibility that
some newer technology may appear to displace his patent. His patent gives him the
opportunity to occupy the field, and if he is able to develop an organization that can
manufacture and sell the patented product at costs equal to any potential entrant, he
may occupy it for many years.
Id.
51 Id. (adding that this is why many firms with innovative products seek a quick and expan-
sive entry into their respective markets).
52 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (requiring a written, enabling disclosure that includes
the best mode of producing the claimed invention and a set of claims, which along with the
specification, defines and notifies the public of the metes and bounds of the invention); see also
State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that the
patent system assures the steady flow of innovations to the marketplace, providing an incentive
via the doctrine of equivalents to develop one's own pioneering product).
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Instead, each firm in a high-technology market must remain cost-
effective and invest profits in research and development in order to
remain profitable.
In fact, the alleged rent seeking costs that result from others ini-
tially duplicating the same research are dwarfed by the overall bene-
fit of competitors utilizing the disclosed information to build new
and better pioneering inventions. These products will be available at
lower production costs and prices for consumers. 53 Thus, any per-
ceived dead weight loss fails to outweigh the overall benefit to soci-
ety, and this market power does not create a monopoly in the anti-
trust sense.
54
To be sure, the patent right does provide the inventor of a pio-
neering invention with cost advantages that provide an opportunity
to reap extraordinary profits, which may exceed those normally re-
cycled into research and development.55 However, a recent article
by Kenneth Dam exploring the economics of patent law suggests
that rather than labeling these profits as monopolistic, they are better
characterized as "economic rent.,,
56
Dam defines economic rent as the difference between the pat-
entee's per-unit costs and competitors' per-unit costs (to the extent
attributable to the patented innovation) multiplied by the patentee's
volume. 57 Economic rents are found throughout the economy wher-
ever "an economic actor has a cost advantage that competitors can-
53 See generally Dam, supra note 39, at 252-53 (noting that as a result of "the relentless ad-
vance of its own technology" the computer industry caused prices to fall, measured in terms of
millions of instructions per second, from $250,000 to $2,500 between 1980 and 1990) (quoting
Andrew S. Rappaport & Shmuel Halevi, The Computerless Computer Company, HARV. Bus.
REV., Jul.-Aug. 1991, at 69, 70); Merges & Nelson, supra note 12 (discussing the economic
theories underlying the American patent system, including the incentive to design around).
54 See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 2.2 ("If a patent or other form of intellec-
tual property does confer market power, that market power does not by itself offend the antitrust
laws. As with any other tangible or intangible asset that enables its owner to obtain significant
supracompetitive profits, market power (or even a monopoly) that is solely 'a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen or historic accident' does not violate the antitrust laws.")
(citing United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563 (1966)); see also United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that the Sherman Act is not violated by
the attainment of market power solely through "superior foresight and industry").
55 However, I concede that in certain areas, such as pharmaceuticals, the overwhelming
need and desire to obtain the fastest and most efficient cure enable drug patents to confer mo-
nopoly power on the patentee. This market power often lasts until a more effective next-
generation drug is patented. This is clearly illustrated in the antibiotic market, where premium
prices are paid for the newest drug that cures bacteria X in a short time period.56 See Dam, supra note 39, at 250; see also CHISUM ET AL., supra note 11, at 66-68 ("ITihe
dead weight loss associated with the patent's potential monopoly effects is analytically analo-
gous to transaction costs of building a fence around the prospect and of the sign designating
ownership. Both are merely indispensable costs of using the system to allocate resources.").
57 See Dam, supra note 39, at 251.
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not match, for legal or other reasons., 58 Thus, one's superior re-
search abilities, like one's superior athletic skills, may set one above
the competition and create rights (legal or natural) that lower costs
and provide a competitive advantage.
For pioneering inventions, Dam's economic rent paradigm ap-
pears more suited to analyzing the patent right than does the concept
of monopoly power.59  Here, the superior skill of the inventor has
solved a pressing societal need. Clearly, the exclusive right to ex-
clude others from making, using and selling the claimed invention
provides the pioneering inventor with a cost advantage that allows
her to reap greater profit-i.e., economic rent-than her competition.
There remains the argument that pioneering inventions are in-
deed monopolies, for without the patent right, innovation and cut-
ting-edge technology would be available to all. This availability
minimizes cost and increases productivity.60 Thus, arguably, for pio-
neering patents in particular (since there are no substitutes), the pat-
ent right restricts production and creates dead-weight loss, 61 a trade-
mark of monopolies.
Dead-weight loss notwithstanding, the term "monopoly" still fails
to fully capture the economics of patentable inventions. 62 The patent
right stimulates competitive research and development (R&D) and
brings pioneering inventions to fruition. Without this exclusive
right, corporations and private investors would not expend the R&D
dollars necessary to develop such devices. 63 From a pricing per-
spective, the inventor would be unable to recoup its R&D costs if
competitors could copy the claimed invention, manufacture it with-
out incurring R&D expenses and undercut the inventor's price.
Without the patent right, the inventor must rely on trade secret pro-
58 Id. at 250 (including examples of regulatory constraints or subsidies stemming from some
form of industrial policy, natural causes, such as superior location in real estate, or superior
talent in the arts and professional sports).
59 Although technically both the terms "monopoly" and "economic power" concede certain
losses associated with pioneering patents, use of the term "monopoly power" fails to acknowl-
edge the acceptability of these losses when factoring in the social benefits of patents providing
incentives to invent, commercialize and design around. Use of the term "monopoly" or "mar-
ket power" places pioneering patents in a negative light. To avoid this casting, I prefer using
Dams s economic rent paradigm. See ki. at 251-53.
60 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 12, at 896 (conceding that pooling and cross-licensing
will mitigate the negative effect of unduly broad patents).
61 See UL at 916 ("When a broad patent is granted or expanded via the doctrine of equiva-
lents, its scope diminishes incentives for others to stay in the invention game, compared to a
patent whose claims are trimmed more closely to the inventor's actual result.").
6 2 See Dam, supra note 39, at 251-52.
63I concede that this proposition fits strongest in industries that rely heavily on patent pro-
tection, such as the pharmaceutical, biotechnology and, to a lesser degree, automotive industries.
See generally Mansfield, supra note 18 (evaluating role of patent procurement on economic
growth in these specific industries).
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tection that may permanently keep pioneering information away
from the public domain. Trade secrets arguably give inventors far
more monopoly power than does the patent right, and without the
quid pro quo of public disclosure. 4 Also, the pioneering invention
has placed something in the market that was previously unavailable,
thereby enhancing productive efficiency rather than inhibiting it.
Thus, "it would be more useful to restrict the concept of monopoly
to circumstances where . . . patent licenses are used, as in certain
classic antitrust cases, as a device for implementing anticompetitive
agreements." 65  Moreover, "[s]ince competitive forces which act
upon a patent holder are readily identifiable, the patent holder cannot
be assumed to have monopoly power." 66
If patents are not monopolies in the pejorative sense of the word,67
and do not inherently confer market power, why do many courts and
scholars view patents as limited monopolies, which during the life of
the patent presumptively confers market power on the patentee?
68
This characterization persists despite indications to the contrary. For
example, as mentioned earlier, the Justice Department in its antitrust
guidelines expressly provides that "[tlhe agency will not presume that
a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market power
upon its owner." 69 Similarly, section 271(d) of the Patent Act states
64 See Dam, supra note 39, at 251-52. To the extent that certain trade secrets can be reverse
engineered, the information is disclosed to the person or entity that discerns it via this process.
Nonetheless, the enabling disclosure remains unavailable to the public at large when protected
by trade secret. Without an enabling disclosure, competitors are unable to build upon the exist-
ing product to create new products that may compete with the original. See also Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (stressing the importance of patent protection to eco-
nomic growth and noting that patent protection acts like a barrier, while trade secret acts like a
sieve); CHISUM ET AL., supra note 11, at 1437 n.3 (noting that despite the language of Kewanee
Oil, trade secrets arguably give broader protection since information remains within the scope of
a trade secret forever, as long as there is no disclosure or reverse engineering).
65 Dam, supra note 39, at 251 (citing SCM v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir.
1981)).
6 Kitch, supra note 24, at 31.
67 See id. at 47 ("The basic distinction adopted in this paper is between a right which con-
fers a comparative advantage in production which is sold into a market where the demand curve
facing the firm has a slope of zero, and a right which confers the advantage of being able to sell
into a market where the demand curve facing the firm has a negative slope. Both kinds of rights
have value. Patents are almost always examples of the first rather than the second class.").
68 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 337 U.S. 293, 307 (1949) (stating that a patent "is at
least prima facie evidence of [market] control" despite the presence of competing substitutes for
the patented article); see also Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,505 n.2
(1969) ("Uniqueness confers economic power only when other competitors are in some way
prevented from offering the distinctive product themselves. Such barriers may be legal as in the
case of patented or copyrighted products.").
69 ANTrrRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 2.2. This is the agency's way of attempting to
negate the per se rule against tying. Under the per se tying rule, if a seller tied a product with
market power to a regular product offered in free market competition, it was presumed to be a
per se tying violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 17 (1984) ("[T]he Court has held that the likelihood that market
[Vol. 49.509
PATENT "MONOPOLYPHOBIA"
that in patent misuse cases it will not be presumed that the patent con-
ferred market power on the patentee.70
Courts err because litigators and scholars are reluctant to make
economic arguments that patent procurement positively stimulates
technological innovation, without inhibiting economic growth and
free market competition. 71 Yet, economists have analyzed the rela-
tionship between intellectual property rights and economic growth for
several years.72 Recent studies indicate that patent procurement
stimulates the economy and countries failing to adequately protect
intellectual property are lagging in industrial growth and develop-
ment.73 The development of this relationship occupies the next Part
of this Article.
II. PATENTS POSITIVELY IMPACT THE ECONOMY
[T]he courts have many ways to manipulate the effects of the
patent system. . . . Moreover, the judicial power to interpret
power exists and is being used to restrain competition in a separate market is sufficient to make
per se condemnation appropriate.").70 See 35 U.S.C § 271(d) (1994).
71 See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1529 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., concurring) (evaluating the economic impact of patents on technologi-
cal progress to determine how courts should handle DOE analysis, with Judge Newman noting
that "[t]he parties and amici curiae did not discuss this public interest aspect"), rev'd, Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). Like Judge Newman, I urge
litigators to consider the economic theory of patents when arguing infringement issues.
72 As noted by Judge Newman in Hilton Davis, Joseph A. Schumpeter was one of the first
economists to argue that inventions alone produce "no economic effect, while patent-based
innovation has a positive impact on the economic system as new industries and new goods
displace the old." Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1529 n.1 (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPI-
TALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950)). In recent years, Zvi Grilliches has ar-
gued that the results are inconclusive that patents stimulate economic growth, while Francis
Narin has argued that patent procurement positively impacts the economy and that patents are
indicators of corporate technical strength. Compare Zvi Griliches, Patents: Recent Trends and
Puzzles, BROOKINGS PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS 291, 316-19 (1989), with Francis Narin &
Elliot Noma, Patents as Indicators of Corporate Technological Strength, 16 RES. POL'Y. 143
(1987) (presenting data of study involving patents and company profits of 17 pharmaceutical
companies).3 See, e.g., David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights
in Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 323, 333 (1996) (examining the role of intellectual
property rights and determining increased economic growth with greater protection, utilizing
cross-country data on patent protection, trade regime and country-specific characteristics); Narin
& Noma, supra note 72, at 143, 155 (noting the limitations of their study, but predicting studies
in other industries). See generally Francis Narin, Parallelism, Leads and Lags Between National
Papers, Corporate Patents and GNP, Presentation at the Paris Technology and Competitiveness
Conference (June 24-27, 1990) (on file with author).
There are also studies that question whether patent procurement stimulates technological
innovation and economic growth. See Griliches, supra note 72, at 303 (crediting decreases in
innovation to deteriorating economic conditions during certain periods); Merges & Nelson,
supra note 12, at 878-79 (discussing the widely accepted idea that more inventions yield more
productivity).
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the generally worded patent statutes can dramatically alter
the economic effects of a patent scheme.74
This section empirically demonstrates that any market power con-
ferred by patents positively impacts economic growth, and therefore
is not anticompetitive or contrary to the public interest. First, select
Supreme Court cases from each judicial cycle are analyzed to illus-
trate that patents were frequently labeled property when favored by
the Court and labeled anticompetitive monopolies during cycles of
judicial hostility. I also graphically document the various cycles of
judicial hostility by counting the number of patent validity adjudica-
tions by appellate courts. I conclude by establishing a positive syn-
ergy between patent validity adjudications, the proportion of patent
applications filed and economic growth.
A. Cyclical Judicial Patent "Monopolyphobia"
The power to exclude which is the essence of every patent is
monopoly power, hence, "[a]ny action to enforce a patent is
in a very explicit sense 'exclusionary,' both in purpose and, if
unsuccessful, in effect. "75
The difficulty is that "monopoly" is used in different senses in
patent and antitrust law, hence its ambiguity. Because of its
antitrust connotations and association with illegality in con-
nection therewith, it often evokes negative reactions inappro-
priate to a dispassionate analysis of patent law problems.76
These quotes illustrate the complexity in tracing patent "mono-
polyphobia." Improper categorization of intellectual property rights
as monopolies in the negative sense is traceable to the ambiguity sur-
rounding the term "monopoly., 77  This ambiguity has its roots in
English common law, antitrust law and the cyclical judicial hostility
74 Mark Grady & Jay Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REv. 305,
307 (1992).
75 Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 992 n.10 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing
LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 181 (1977)), aft'd,
743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984).
76 In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 1574, 1577 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
77 "Monopoly," by its economically neutral definition, is nothing more than an exclusive
right, encompassing patent and other property rights. However, commentators note that the
"meaning of monopoly that is of concern to the scientific student of economic behavior is the
condition that generates social loss," thereby impeding free market competition. See Kitch,
supra note 24, at 33; see also Rose, supra note 9, at 665-72; Rupert, supra note 43, at 755.
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toward patents.78 It has created confusion that has resulted in courts'
crossing the line from ambiguously using the term "monopoly" to
affirmatively labeling patent rights as anticompetitive and contrary to
the public interest.79 This judicial mindset increases the likelihood of
patents being held invalid during infringement litigation, which nega-
tively impacts patent filings, thereby inhibiting technological innova-
tion and economic growth.80
Donald Chisum, in his leading treatise on patents, notes that the
Supreme Court periodically shifted its view toward patents, going
from cycles where patents were under fire to cycles where patents
were in favor.81 When patents were in favor, more patents were held
valid and enforced by the courts.82 Conversely, when patents were
under fire, courts narrowly applied the Patent Act and often held pat-
ents invalid or misused.8 3 For example, during the period 1892-1930,
courts broadly applied the Patent Act, labeling patents pro-
competitive monopolies having the attributes of property.84 During
the second cycle of judicial hostility (1930-1950), however, courts
described patents as anticompetitive monopolies, narrowly applied
the Patent Act and often held patents invalid. 5
78 See Rose, supra note 9, at 665-72 (providing a brief history of the English common law
approach and an economically neutral definition of "monopoly").
79 Compare Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 417-24
(1908), and General Electric Co. v. Wise, 119 F. 922,924 (N.D.N.Y. 1903) (using "monopoly"
in economically neutral sense to describe patents as property or a right to exclude), with Mer-
coid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S 661, 667 (1944) (characterizing patents as anti-
competitive monopolies).
80 See, e.g., J. THOMAS McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:5[A]
(1973) ("Tlhe court's attitude toward patents, by a sort of intellectual osmosis, affected their
rulings concerning trade symbols. When more recently, the older, stricter, judicial views about
patents reemerged, this strictness, in part at least, seems to have carried over into the trade-name
decisions.") (quoting Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1945)
(Frank, J., concurring)).
81 See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ OV-9 to OV-12 (1993) (arguing that
patents were "under fire" from 1880-1892, "in favor" from 1892-1930, "renewed fire" from
1930-1950 and "in favor" again with the passing of the 1952 Patent Act).82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See, e.g., Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 36 (1923);
McAleer v. United States, 150 U.S. 424,429-32 (1893); Amer. Steel Foundries v. Laughlin, 30
F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1928).
85 See, e.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip., 340 U.S. 147, 152
(1950); Automatic Radio Mfg. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 838-40 (1950) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); United States
v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 309-10 (1948); General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance
Corp., 304 U.S. 364 (1938); Pfotzer v. Aqua Sys., Inc., 162 F.2d 779,784 (2d Cir. 1947); Lack-
ner Co. v. Quehl Sign Co., 145 F.2d 932,934 (6th Cir. 1944).
During the modern era (post-1950), courts have vacillated between a positive and a nega-
tive use of the term "monopoly," but generally have been less likely to condemn patents as
anticompetitive. This is particularly true in recent cases. See, e.g., Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm
Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding validity of drug patent). Many recent decisions
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H.R. Mayers, former counsel to General Electric, was the first to
argue a connection between the various cycles of judicial hostility
towards patents and public sentiment towards industry and innova-
tion. Mayers evaluated the percentage of patents held valid as part of
the infringement analysis by the Supreme Court and courts of appeals
from 1850-1958.86 He analyzed the intersection of patent and anti-
trust law noting that the "passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 coin-
cides roughly with the first point of major severity in the action of the
,,87courts with respect to patents.
Figure 1 in the Appendix incorporates Mayers's data, Federal Cir-
cuit case data,88 as well as my own appellate court case data, to illus-
trate that the cyclical judicial hostility towards patents went well be-
yond 1958, into the modern era of patent law.89
do not describe patents in terms of monopolies at all. See, e.g., U.S. Philips Corp. v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 55 F.3d 592 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (using the doctrine of judicial estoppel to preclude
antitrust claims); Vollrath Co. v. Sammi Corp., 9 F.3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating cer-
tain criteria necessary for a monopolization claim); Information Exchange System v. First Bank
Nat'l Ass'n, 994 F.2d 478,484 (8th Cir. 1993) (dismissing antitrust claims against bank).
86 See H.R. Mayers, The United States Patent System in Historical Perspective, 3 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. RES. & EDUc. 33 (1959). "Through the period 1850 to 1958, the
action of the appellate courts on patents coming before them for determination of validity has
varied radically." Id. at 34. Mayers cites several theses for the cyclical validity holdings, in-
cluding the quality of American inventions, public opinion and judicial sentiment. He further
cites secondary factors such as introducing the reissue era and the creation of the courts of ap-
peals, which did not occur until 1891. See id. at 37-45.
87 Id. at 46. Mayers goes on to closely analyze the public and political sentiment of the pe-
riod extending through the early 1940s, paying particular attention to industry sentiment and the
White House's response to antitrust laws. See id. at 46-50. He puts forth several arguments as
to why the public's fear of monopolies led to a lukewarm response to industrial and technologi-
cal innovation, which ultimately permeated the White House and the judiciary. See id. at 50. He
concedes, however, that many of the public pressure antitrust arguments "could be adduced as
to the non-relevance of Wilsonian antitrustism to the public opinion concept of patent trends."
Id. at 50. He notes that since President Wilson was more of a trendsetter than a follower of
public opinion, this precludes assuming that he considered himself guided by any public
"monopolyphobic" mandate. See id. Instead, he may have viewed himself as a positive force
for the maintenance of corporate business, and may have ushered in a new cycle where "busi-
ness had the benefit of a general sentiment favorable to the maintenance of profit incentives,
including the incentive of enforcement of reasonably sustainable patent claims." Id.
88 The Federal Circuit data from 1982-1994 was graciously supplied by Donald Dunner and
is excerpted from his leading article, which takes a statistical look at the Federal Circuit's patent
decisions from 1982 through 1994. See Dunner et aL, supra note 17, at 179-80. We counted
cases utilizing the Mayers approach, which took a decision holding any claim of a patent valid
as an overall validity count favorable to the patentee, even though other claims may have been
held invalid and not infringed. See Mayers, supra note 86, at 34 (detailing this method).
89 See also Sergei S. Zlinkoff, Monopoly Versus Competition: Significant Trends in Patent,
Anti-Trust, Trademark, and Unfair Competition Suits, 53 YALE LJ. 514, 518-25 (1944) (pro-
viding an excellent statistical analysis of the trend of the Supreme Court to limit patent rights
based on "monopolyphobia"). Zlinkoff statistically documents a fundamental theme running
throughout the Supreme Court's decisions during this period, namely "an insistence that the
'public interest' shall be considered the dominant interest in these matters and that this interest
is best served by a freely competitive economic system from which have been removed as many
monopolistic restrictions as possible." Id. at 516.
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1. Patents in Favor (1892-1930)
During the first cycle of judicial favor toward patents (1892-
1930),90 several opinions used "monopoly" in its economically neu-
tral sense and often linked this term to property. For example, in
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,91 the Court
refers to the patent monopoly as economically beneficial and opines
that the inventor has created or discovered something of value. As a
result, "[i]t is his absolute property, [h]e may withhold the knowledge
of it from the public, and he may insist upon all the advantages and
benefits which the statute promises to him who discloses to the public
his invention."92 Similarly, in General Electric Co. v. Wise,93 the
District Court of New York expressly refers to patents as property,
then notes in the same paragraph:
[i]n a sense, the granting of a patent confers a monopoly on
the inventor or owner of such patent, but such a monopoly is
granted in the interest of the public as well as of the grantee
of the patent, and is an encouragement to the development of
inventive skill and genius.
94
And in Crown Die & Tool v. Nye Tool & Machine Works,95 the
Court refers to patent rights as unique statutory property.96  These
cases illustrate that during times when patents were in favor, courts
were more likely to use "monopoly" in the economically neutral
sense and equate it with a property right to exclude. Most impor-
tantly, during this era, patent rights were not presumed to be anticom-
petitive devices. 97
90 From 1880 to 1892, the first cycle of judicial hostility towards patents occurred. Al-
though these cases contain numerous pejorative references to the patent "monopoly," this cycle
was relatively short-lived. Outright patent "monopolyphobia" did not occur until the second
cycle of judicial hostility (1930-1950). See, e.g., CHISUM Er AL., supra note 11, at 22-23;
Zlinkoff, supra note 89, at 518-25 (providing a historical overview of patent right limitations
imposed by the Supreme Court).
9' 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
92Id. at 424
93 119 F. 922 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1903).
94Id. at 924.
" 261 U.S. 24 (1923).96 See id. at 35.
97 See, e.g., Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192,200 (1883). The Court cautioned:
The design of the patent laws is to reward those who make some substantial discov-
ery or invention, which adds to our knowledge and makes a step in advance in the
useful arts. Such inventors are worthy of all favor. It was never the object of those
laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an
idea, which would naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or op-
erator in the ordinary progress of manufacture. Such an indiscriminate creation of
exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate invention.
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2. The First Patent "Monopolyphobia" (1931-1950)
As illustrated in Figure 1 and Table 1 in the Appendix, the
Court's "monopolyphobic" trend heightened during the second
cycle of judicial hostility toward patents (1930-1950).98 For ex-
ample, between 1927-1931, 50.4% of patents adjudicated were
held valid;99 by 1944, the percent adjudicated held valid had fallen
to 21.6%. Indeed, Chisum notes that the Supreme Court's "anti-
patent bias was so pronounced that Justice Jackson would com-
plain in dissent, that the only valid patents were those that the
Court had not been able to get its hands on."'1 Interestingly, this
cycle parallels the general anti-monopoly sentiment fostered by the
Court's implementation of the Sherman Act in cases involving ty-
ing the sale of a patented product to an unpatented product readily
available in the public domain.101 Similarly, the most common
defense in patent infringement cases during this period was that
98 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 11, at 22-23 ("From 1890-1930 patents were viewed fa-
vorably by the Court; but from about 1930 to 1950, the Court approached patents with a great
deal of suspicion, emphasizing the monopolistic and social-cost aspect of patents.").
99 Although the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed in 1890, it took several years for fear of
restraint of trade to permeate the intellectual property infringement or antitrust analysis. As
noted by Willard Tom and Joshua Newberg of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC):
In the first twenty years after the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, antitrust
was no match for intellectual property in the perceived "conflict" between the two
bodies of law. When faced with competition law challenges to the exercise of intel-
lectual property rights, courts tended to resolve disputes by deferring to the preroga-
tives of the intellectual property holder.
Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate
Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST LJ. 167, 168 (1997); see also Bement v. National
Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) ("[T]he general rule is absolute freedom in the use or sale
of rights under the patent laws of the United States.").
1oo CHIStJM ET AL., supra note 11, at 22 (citing Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S.
560, 571-72 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
'01 Abuse of the term "monopoly" to manipulate public sentiment against patent rights did
not originate in the United States. The anti-patent movement had a stronghold in Europe during
the mid-19th century. Anti-patent scholars and economists cleverly linked their movement to
the rising ideological tide against tariff protection. See Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The
Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST 1, 9 (1950).
The strength in nineteenth century Europe of the movements against privilege and
monopoly and for free international trade was such that the ideological linking of
patent protectionism with tariff protectionism and of patent monopoly with monop-
oly privileges in general tended to help the opponents and to weaken the defenders
of the patent system. It was strategically essential for the latter [patent advocates]
to separate as far as possible the idea of patent protection from the monopoly issue
and from the free trade issue.
Id. The authors state that by 1873 the patent advocates had triumphed by presenting "the case
of patent protection as one of natural law and private property." Id. They further note that
"[t]he arguments for patents, formulated in these terms... are still used today [in the United
States] whenever the patent system is debated." Id. As I will establish in Part m of this Article,
the property rights argument is indeed the strongest argument to advocate a broad base of intel-
lectual property rights, including patent rights.
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the patentee had misused the patent right by illegally tying the pat-
ented product to a second unpatented product1°2 (recall that tying
arrangements that restrain competition are in direct violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act 03).
The courts' use of "monopoly" in patent antitrust cases during the
second cycle of judicial hostility ultimately permeated the opinions in
patent infringement cases. This in turn created a negative presump-
tion or "monopolyphobia" concerning patent rights, causing courts
more often than not to invalidate or restrict the patent rights at is-
sue. 1 4 The patent misuse cases most illustrative of judicial hostility
toward patents were decided during the 1940s, the decade of height-
ened judicial activism on the Supreme Court.105
In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,106 the patentee was ac-
cused of patent misuse for restraining the sale of unpatented salt tab-
lets by requiring licensees to use only tablets sold by the patentee
102 Today, section 271(d) of the Patent Act expressly provides that patent misuse will not be
presumed simply because the patentee has "conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or
the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or
purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has mar-
ket power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale
is conditioned." 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994); see also Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (evaluating how the enactment of section 271 affected the doctrines of
contributory infringement and patent misuse).
103 See 15 U.S.C § 1 (1994) ("Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be guilty of a felony.'); see also
United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-51 (1962) (reverting to pre-1892 anti-patent atti-
tudes and expanding the patent misuse doctrine by holding that a patent was unenforceable if the
patentee attempted to extend its patent monopoly through tying arrangements or other improper
practices). Tying is found when the seller of one product, most often the patented product, con-
ditions the sale of the product on the buyer purchasing a second product (the tied product),
generally unpatented, from a seller or a designated third party. Tying is in direct violation of the
Sherman or Clayton Acts if (1) the "seller has appreciable economic power" in the tying prod-
uct, or (2) "the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied market."
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451,461-62 (1992); see also North-
ern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1958) (stating that the problem with tying
arrangements lies with the use of market power rather than whether or not it is a monopoly).
104 Although the ambiguous and often anticompetitive use of "monopoly" is found during
the first cycle of judicial hostility toward patents (1880-1982), it is during the second cycle that
we observe a true germination of patent "monopolyphobia." In fact, Zlinkoff points out:
[i]n the year 1943 alone, the various circuit courts of appeals in thirty-four cases
ruled the patent claims involved to be entirely invalid for lack of invention or prior
anticipation, or found no infringement. In the eight cases where the Supreme Court
was petitioned to review these decision, certiorari was denied.
Zlinkoff, supra note 89, at 520. This was also the zenith for antitrust cases in general, since the
Supreme Court composition tipped toward justices who zealously protected the public interest.
See id. at 516.
105 See CHSUM ET AL, supra note 11, at 22.
0 314 U.S: 488 (1942).
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with its patented salt machines. 1'7 In holding the patent unenforce-
able due to tying, the Supreme Court stated:
The grant to the inventor of the special privilege of a patent
monopoly carries out a public policy adopted by the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States.... But the public pol-
icy ... forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive
right or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office
and which it is contrary to public policy to grant. 108
The Court further opined that "[w]here the patent is used as a means
of restraining competition with the patentee's sale of an unpatented
product, the successful prosecution of an infringement suit... is a
powerful aid to the maintenance of the attempted monopoly of the
unpatented product, thwarting the public policy underlying the grant
of the patent."109
By distinguishing the special privilege of the patent monopoly
from the unlawful limited monopoly that takes place with tying,
the Court established that the tying arrangement alone unlawfully
extended the patentee's monopoly, in violation of the public inter-
est.10° Thus, one could infer that during this period the Supreme
Court acknowledged that patent rights lawfully exercised by the
patentee were not anticompetitive monopolies. Nevertheless, in
later patent cases, the same Court blurs the line between anti-
trust/anticompetitive monopolies and the patent privilege. 111
107 The Morton Salt facts are illustrative of the typical tying arrangement, in which a seller
makes the purchase of a second product a prerequisite to obtaining the first or desired product.
In patent cases, the desired product is often the patented product, and the tied product is an
unpatented product that is freely available on the market. A tying arrangement is per se illegal
"wherever a party has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to apprecia-
bly restrain free competition in the market for the tied product and 'not insubstantial' amount of
interstate commerce is affected." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); see
also Brinson, supra note 34, at 35-36 (discussing which tying arrangements are legal and which
are illegal).
'0' Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492.
'09 Id. at 493.
110 The Court took great pains in distinguishing how tying arrangements adversely affect the
public interest and are in restraint of trade. See id. at 493.
"1 See Zlinkoff, supra note 89, at 516 (suggesting that this pattern emerged because seven
of the nine Supreme Court justices appointed between 1937 and 1944 were appointed as "cham-
pion[s] of free competition as the fundamental characteristic of our economic structure"); see
also United States v. Masonite Corp. 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942) (illustrating how the Court
exhibited true patent "monopolyphobia," by expressly characterizing the patent privilege itself
as being "restrictive of a free economy"). The Court's opinion establishes that patents are law-
ful anticompetitive monopolies that become unlawfully extended and unenforceable when used
in violation of the Sherman or Clayton Antitrust Acts. See id. at 280; see also United States v.
Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287, 310 (1948) ("The monopoly granted by the patent laws is a
statutory exception to this freedom for competition and consistently has been construed as lim-
ited by the patent grant"). As in Masonite, the Court goes on to distinguish that "[ilt is not the
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In Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investing Co., 1 12 the Supreme
Court openly declared war on patent rights. The patentee in Mercoid
alleged contributory infringement and the Defendant counter-claimed,
alleging conspiracy to extend the patent monopoly in violation of an-
titrust laws.11 3 The Supreme Court held that the patentee's tying of an
unpatented stoker switch to a combination patent for heating systems
was beyond the patentee's monopoly,114 although the unpatented arti-
cle was designed solely for the product covered by the combination
patent.115 The Court combined antitrust and patent monopoly con-
cepts in balancing the patentee's rights against the public interest,
stating that "[t]he necessities or convenience of the patentee do not
justify any use of the monopoly of the patent to create another mo-
nopoly... The instant case is a graphic illustration of the evils of an
expansion of the patent monopoly by private engagements.'
'
"
6
Later in the opinion, the Court weakly attempted to distinguish
antitrust monopolies from the patent right, stating that "[i]f a limited
monopoly over the combustion stoker switch were allowed, it would
not be a monopoly accorded inventive genius by the patent laws but a
monopoly born of a commercial desire to avoid the rigors of compe-
tition fostered by the antitrust laws."'"17 Nonetheless, this distinction
appears to be one of degree only, with patents being lawfully anti-
monopoly of the patent that is invalid. It is the use of that monopoly, improperly." Id. None-
theless, the Court's basic premise remains that patent rights, although legal, are anticompetitive.
Therein lies the problem.
For a line of cases decided during this era that invalidated important patents in various in-
dustries, see Zlinkoff, supra note 89, at 518 n.7. Lower courts followed the "monopolyphobic"
trend of the Supreme Court during this period. See, e.g., Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128
F.2d 632, 636 (2d Cir. 1942) ("We cannot, moreover, ignore the fact that the Supreme Court,
whose work is final, has for a decade or more shown an increasing disposition to raise the stan-
dard of originality necessary for a patent. In this we recognize 'a pronounced new doctrinal
trend' which it is our 'duty, cautiously to be sure, to follow, not to resist."') (quoting Perkins v.
Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1942)).
112 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
13 See id. at 662.
114 See id. at 667.
115 See id. at 664. As noted by Zlinkoff, "[i]n reversing the circuit court, which had sus-
tained the charge of contributory infringement, the majority overruled the Supreme Court's prior
ruling in the case of Leeds & Catlin Company v. Victor Talking Machine Company, a leading
decision on contributory infringement." Zlinkoff, supra note 89, at 523 (citation omitted).
"
6 Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 666.
"
7 Id. at 668. As stated by Justice Douglas:
The grant of a patent is the grant of a special privilege 'to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.'.. . It carries, of course, a right to be free from competition
in the practice of the invention. But the limits of the patent are narrowly and strictly
confined to the precise terms of the grant.... It is the protection of the public in a
system of free enterprise which alike nullifies a patent where any part of it is inva-
lid.... and denies to the patentee after issuance the power to use it in such a way as
to acquire a monopoly which is not plainly within the terms of the grant.
Id. at 665-66 (citation omitted).
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competitive, and antitrust monopolies unlawfully anticompetitive.
Indeed, Mercoid's pervasive holding is that patent rights are narrowly
defined anticompetitive monopolies that operate as secondary to the
public interest. 
118
Interestingly, during this period, some judicial decisions did
make efforts to objectively evaluate the patent right as property.119
What the early line of patent misuse cases left unresolved, how-
ever, was whether the limited monopoly granted under the patent
right automatically conferred market power.
In International Salt Co. v. United States,1 20 the Supreme Court
held that tying the sale of unpatented salt products to a lease for pat-
ented salt machines restrained trade in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.12' The court opined that "[b]y contracting to close this
market for salt against competition, International has engaged in a
restraint of trade for which its patents afford no immunity from the
antitrust laws."' 22 Although the Justices' arguments fail to link the
patent right with market or economic power, International Salt was
later cited by the Court in United States v. Loew's Inc. 123 for this very
proposition.
3. Judicial Wavering (1950-1983)
The 1952 Patent Act was enacted largely in response to the
"monopolyphia" that permeated the Court between 1930-1950.124
"' See id. at 665.
119 During the second cycle of judicial hostility the Court occasionally, like a voice in the
wilderness, stated that the patent right was indeed an earned property right. See, e.g., United
States v. Dubilier Condenser, 289 U.S. 173, 183-86 (1933) ("The government has no more
power to appropriate a man's property invested in a patent than it has to take his property in-
vested in real estate .... [someone] may exercise his inventive faculties in any direction he
chooses, with the assurance that whatever invention he may thus conceive and perfect is his
individual property."). This case was decided at the beginning of this judicial cycle (1933) and
as noted by Zlinkoff, it was decided by the later appointees to the court (Justices Black, Reed,
Douglas, Frankfurter, Murphy, Jackson and Rutledge), who were known as the champions of
free competition. See Zlinkoff, supra note 89, at 516 n.5.
120 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
121 See id. at 395-96.
122 Id. (citing Morton Salt and Mercoid).
123 371 U.S. 38 (1962). This case is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 146-52.
124 See CHISJM ET AL., supra note 11, at 22-23, 532-33 (noting that the "flash of creative
genius" test articulated by the Supreme Court in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices
Corp, 314 U.S. 84 (1941), was the last straw for members of the Patent Bar). Chisum notes that
the Patent Bar perceived the Cuno standard as raising "the hurdle of patentability above and
beyond the 'requirement for invention."' CHISUM ET AL., supra note 11, at 532. In 1948, Presi-
dent Roosevelt appointed a National Patent Planning Commission that eventually proposed that
Congress "declare a national standard whereby patentability of an invention shall be determined
by the objective test as to its advancement of the arts and sciences." Id. at 533 (citing H.R. Doc.
NO. 78-239, at 6, 10 (1943)). Its report, along with a second "monopolyphobic" opinion, Great
Atlantic Tea & Pac. Tea Corp. v. Supermarket Equip., 340 U.S. 147 (1950), prompted Judge
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The 1952 Patent Act ushered in a new era where patentability re-
quirements and infiingement were more equitably defined. 125 For
example, section 261 expressly gave patents the "attributes of per-
sonal property."'126 Section 103 of the Act codified the non-
obviousness requirement 27 from case law.128 Section 112 overturned
the Court's decision in Halliburton29 and reinstated the use of
"means plus function" claims.130 Section 271(a), (b) and (c) formally
defined direct infringement, inducement of infringement and con-
tributory infringement, while also overturning the Court's broad
reading of patent misuse and contributory infringement in Mercoid.131
Although the 1952 Act strengthened the concept of patents as
property, courts continued struggling with claim interpretation and
enforcement of patent rights.132  In patent appeals, there was great
disparity among the circuits. 133 Some circuits viewed patents favora-
bly, while others "displayed a distinct patent bias. ' l 4 As seen in Fig-
ure 1, there were periodic dips in validity adjudications, reflecting a
Giles S. Rich and other key members of the Patent Bar to draft the 1952 Patent Act. See CHISUM
ET AL, supra note 11, at 533.
12 5 For decisions indicating how the Supreme Court, prior to the 1952 Act, made patentabil-
ity much harder to attain, see CHIsuM ET AL., supra note 11, at 22.
26 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).27 Section 103 presently states:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or de-
scribed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person hav-
ing ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall
not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
12 The 1952 Act's drafters obtained the "person of ordinary skill" language from the "ordi-
nary mechanic" language of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850). See CHISUM ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 531-32; see also Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention" Require-
ment, 1 AIPLA QJ. 26 (1972) (noting that one of the underlying policies behind section 103
was "to cut loose altogether the century-old term invention," and replace it with "conditions of
patentability").
129 Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946). In Halliburton, the
Court abolished the "means plus function" to include all means disclosed in the specification,
plus equivalents known at the time. See Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 8-11. A simplified example of
a "means plus function" claim is a widget, comprising X, Y, and a means of fastening X to Y.
"
30 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) ("An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed
as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material,
or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding struc-
ture, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.").
131 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); see 35 U.S.C. § 271
(1994).
132 See CHiSUM ET AL, supra note 11, at 23 ("The 1952 Act did a great deal to strengthen
our patent system, but problems, mainly procedural in nature remained.").
33 Prior to 1982 and the formation of the Federal Circuit as the mandatory court for patent
appeals, regional circuit courts heard patent appeals from their respective circuits. See CHISUM
ET AL, supra note 11, at 23-24.1 Id. at 23.
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struggle between viewing patents as property or anticompetitive mo-
nopolies. This floundering is illustrated throughout the judicial
opinions of this era.
a. Graver Tank (1950): A Return to Favoring Patents
In Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co. 135
the Court retreated from its "monopolyphobic view" and expansively
evaluated patents as property. 136 The Graver Tank court established
the modem standard for infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents ("DOE") where literal infringement is absent, yet the alleged
infringing device "performs substantially the same function in sub-
stantially the same way, to obtain the same result."'137 The Court held
that the patentee's electric welding composition was the equivalent of
the accused device which substituted a non-alkaline earth metal,
manganese, for the patentee's alkaline earth metal, magnesium. 138 It
opined that the accused device "and the composition of the patent in
suit are substantially identical in operation and in result.
139
As might be expected, the term "monopoly" is conspicuously ab-
sent from the majority's opinion. The dissent, however, used the term
in its public interest argument against applying this equitable doctrine
to broaden the claim for alkaline earth metal to include manganese,
when the patent claim was "free from ambiguous language." 14  Jus-
tice Black noted:
The way specific problems are approached naturally has
much to do with the decisions reached. A host of prior cases
... have treated the 17-year monopoly authorized by valid
patents as a narrow exception to our competitive enterprise
system. For that reason, they have emphasized the impor-
135 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
136 See id. passim.
137 Id. at 608. The doctrine of equivalents is considered an equitable doctrine because it goes
beyond the plain language of the Patent Act, which requires that the infringer literally copy each
claimed element before literal infringement can be found under section 271 of the Patent Act.
See id. at 607-08. The majority's view, affirming this equitable expansion of patent rights, was
fairly controversial because it came at the tail end of the second cycle of judicial hostility to-
ward patents. At this time, the Supreme Court was more likely to limit a patentee's rights than
find an equitable basis to establish these rights. See Zlinkoff, supra note 89, at 518 ("In the
patent field during the past ten years, the Supreme Court has invalidated approximately twenty
important patents dominating portions of industries as diverse as the motion picture, telegraph,
radio, chemical, and machinery fields.").
138 See Graver Tank 339 U.S. at 610-12.
139 Id. at 611. The Court was persuaded by expert testimony and other patents indicating
that "alkaline earth metals are often found in manganese ores in their natural state and that they
serve the same purpose in fluxes... [thus,] '[i]n the sense of the patent,' manganese could be
included as an alkaline earth metal." Id. at 610-11.
'40 Id. at 613 (Black, J., dissenting).
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tance of leaving business men free to utilize all knowledge
not preempted by the precise language of a patent claim.
141
Inherent in the Black dissent is an acknowledgment of the section
112 notice requirement. 142 That is, the doctrine of equivalents can not
be used in a manner that undermines the public's reliance on the pat-
ent specification and claims defining the "metes and bounds" of the
invention.143 Arguably, the majority considered this tension when
opining that "what constitutes equivalency must be determined
against the context of the patent, the prior art, and the particular cir-
cumstances of the case."'1  Moreover, even though prior cases la-
beled patents as a narrow exception to a competitive economic sys-
tem, this characterization does not negate the reality that patents are
not per se anticompetitive. Thus, Justice Black needed to remind the
majority of the balance at stake, without resorting to terminology im-
plying that patents impede free market competition and should be
strictly, rather than equitably, evaluated.
b. United States v. Loew's (1962) : The Court-Created Presump-
tion that Patents Confer Market Power
In United States v. Loew's, Inc.,145 the Court rotated back to the
"monopolyphobia" era by holding that patents were anticompetitive
monopolies that conferred market power. Here, the tying of the sale
or lease of the blockbuster copyrighted film "Gone With the Wind" to
the sale or lease of lesser-known copyrighted films was held to be a
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.146 The Court erroneously
141 id. at 617 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Lackner v. Quehl Sign Co.,
145 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir. 1944) (using the term "monopoly" and holding that the patentee's
rights are secondary to the public interest).
142 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (outlining four distinct disclosure requirements: 1) a written
description; 2) an enabling disclosure; 3) disclosure of the best mode; and 4) a set of claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention).
143 See, e.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(noting that the purpose of section 112 requirements are to give the public "fair notice of what
the patentee and the Patent and Trademark Office have agreed constitute the metes and bounds
of the claimed invention").
'4 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609. Arguably, the majority's subsequent analysis was flawed
in including within the patent's scope information that was already disclosed in the prior art.
See Paul M. Janicke, Heat of Passion: What Really Happened in Graver Tank, 24 AIPLA QJ.
1, 6 (1996) (arguing that a close examination of the facts surrounding Graver Tank indicates
that "the courts, moved by passions that drove the case and particularly by the perceived justice
of Linde's cause, misapplied the doctrine, inadvertently causing the Linde patent to cover the
prior art"). But see Leon Chasan, A Valid Patent--Graver v. Linde, 5 INTRAMURAL L. REV.
N.Y.U. 70 (1950) (applauding the Graver Tank decision as "halting the Supreme Court's ten-
dency to 'attentuate' patent rights").
14' 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
146 See id. at 51.
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cited International Salt Co. v. United States 47 as holding that eco-
nomic power is presumed when the tying product is patented or copy-
righted. 148 The Court argued that patent law intersects with antitrust
law, such that "the existence of a valid patent establishes a distinct-
iveness sufficient to conclude that any tying product would have anti-
competitive consequences."' 149 Ironically, there is little in the plain
language of International Salt or any other patent misuse case sup-
porting this Court-created presumption of market power. The Loew's
presumption ultimately wreaked havoc in patent infringement and
antitrust cases for the next two decades. Today, section 271(d) of the
Patent Act expressly overrules the Loew's presumption, but its appli-
cation is limited to patent infringement cases.' 50  Yet, courts have
continued to resist expressly overruling Loew's in antitrust cases in-
volving intellectual property. 51
c. Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980): Patents Viewed as
Economically Beneficial Rights
In recent years there have been cases in which the courts have
broadly and equitably viewed patent rights. 52  In Diamond v. Chak-
rabarty,53 the Supreme Court broadened the statutory interpretation
of patentable subject matter' 54 to include human engineered micro-
organisms, without a single reference to the patent monopoly.155 In_
stead, the majority's historical analysis of patents included language
which affirmed patents as economically beneficial property rights:
' The authority of Congress is exercised in the hope that '[the] pro-
147 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
148 Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45. The Loew's Court also erroneously cites United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), for the market power presumption. See id.
149 Id. at 46 (noting that "[e]ven absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial eco-
nomic power may be inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers or from
uniqueness in its attributes"); see also Brinson, supra note 34, at 41 (noting that using the flexi-
ble Loew's standard, one would be hard pressed to find any type of tying arrangement which
"logically could not be found to be illegal") (quoting Richard E. Day, Exclusive Dealing, Tying
and Reciprocity-A Reappraisal, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 539,547 (1968)).
50 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994).
151 See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992) (at-
tempting to distinguish Loeiv's by reasoning that "flegal presumptions that rest on formalistic
distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law"); see
also Atari Games v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (involving the
tying of home video game machines to video cartridges that were both patented and copy-
righted; in this case the Federal Circuit completely ignored the Loew's presumption with respect
to the copyrighted material and merely stated that patents do not presumptively confer market
power).
152 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 11, at 23-25.
' 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
1-14 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
'5- See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 317.
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ductive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society
through the introduction of new products, increased employment and
better lives for our citizens. ' 156  The Court further noted, "[tihe
Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Con-
gress intended statutory subject matter to include anything under the
sun that is made by man." 157 Similarly, in Nickola v. Peterson,1 5 the
Sixth Circuit commented that the "statutory, and therefore proper,
characterization [of the patent right] is not 'patent monopoly,' but
patent property."'159
4. The Formation of the Federal Circuit (1982-present): A
Glimmer of Hope, but Continued Wavering by the Court
The formation of the Federal Circuit in 1982 as the mandatory ap-
pellate court for patent cases greatly increased inventor confidence in
the ability of the judiciary to properly adjudicate patent procurement
and infringement.16 The creation of this Circuit meant that there
156 Id. at 307 (citing Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)). The dissent also
emphasized that the "patent laws attempt to reconcile this Nation's deep seated antipathy to
monopolies with the need to encourage progress.... [Thus, in the] absence of legislative di-
rection, the courts should leave to Congress the decisions whether and how far to extend the
patent privilege into areas where the common understanding has been that patents are not avail-
able" Id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966)
and Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518,530-31 (1972)).
Fortunately, other courts have echoed the majority's view of patents as economically bene-
ficial exclusive rights. See, e.g., U.S.M. Corps. v. S.P.S. Techs., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir.
1982) (arguing for a view of patents as monopolies that may not be anticompetitive); United
States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 646-67 (9th Cir. 1981) (acknowledging
tension between antitrust and patent laws by noting that "one body of law creates and protects
monopoly power while the other seeks to proscribe it"); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1295-96 (3d Cir. 1979) (establishing that one must conduct market analy-
sis before determining that obtaining patent via fraud is an "attempt to monopolize in violation
of the antitrust laws"); W.L. Gore v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 614, 622 (3d Cir. 1976) (distin-
guishing patents from antitrust/anticompetitive monopolies).
1-7 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, at 5 (1952) and H.R. REP. No.
1923, at 6 (1952)).
"" 580 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1978).
151 Id. at 914 n.25. The court stated:
The term monopoly connotes the giving of an exclusive privilege for buying, selling,
working or using a thing which the public freely enjoyed prior to the grant.... [but
the] inventor deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery,
but gives something of value to the community by adding to the sum of human
knowledge.
Id.; see also In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Nickola for Markey's
patent-as-property view); Schenk v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("It
is but an obfuscation to refer to a patent as 'the patent monopoly' or to describe a patent as an
'exception to the general rule against monopolies."').
160 See Dunner et aL, supra note 17, at 151-55 (1995) (noting that many viewed the Federal
Circuit as pro-patent). Dunner's statistical analysis refutes these views by analyzing Federal
Circuit cases for this 11-year period and observing that although there was a high percentage of
validity affirmances (88% for section 103 and 85% for section 112) the court affirmed the
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would be uniform patent review and elimination of forum shop-
ping. 161 Also, because certain judges possessed patent and/or other
intellectual property backgrounds, patentees anticipated increased
consistency in patentability and infringement evaluations. 162 Never-
theless, the Federal Circuit has not been without its own periods of
"monopolyphobia," 163 as demonstrated by its cyclical attitude toward
the doctrine of equivalents; this issue came to a head in Hilton Davis
Chemical Co. v. Warner Jenkinson Co. 164
Hilton Davis epitomizes the competing policies frequently at war
in the patent system. Generally, federal patent law adequately bal-
ances the property right of an inventor against the public's right to the
free dissemination and use of information. In the area of patent in-
fringement, however, there remains tension between an inventor's
right to protect against a competitor making mere insubstantial
changes to an invention-changes which would be beyond the literal
language of the claims-and a competitor's right to rely on a claim's
providing adequate notice of the scope of an invention. Unfortu-
nately, section 271 of the Patent Act merely covers literal infringe-
ment of patent claims, and patentees seeking protection against non-
literal infringement must rely on the doctrine of equivalents, a court-
created remedy.165  Hilton Davis provided the catalyst for a hotly
PTO's determination of unpatentability about 80% of the time. See id.; see also R.B. Codley,
What the Federal Circuit Has Done and How Often: Statistical Study of the CAFA Decisions
1982-1988, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y. 385, 391 (1989) (analyzing appealed patent
claims from 1982-1988 and concluding that if the lower court held the patent claims valid, the
Federal Circuit affirmed that decision in virtually every case).
161 See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20-21 (1981) ("[S]ome circuit courts are regarded as 'pro-
patent' and others 'anti-patent', and much time and money is expended in 'shopping' for a fa-
vorable venue.").
162 See CHISLM ET AL., supra note 11, at 31-32.
163 See Dunner et al., supra note 17, at 155-56. Although not expressly using the term
"monopolyphobia," Dunner documents the cyclical response of even the Federal Circuit toward
infringement cases. For example, he notes that in the last five years of his study, the court af-
firmed non-infringement as often as it affirmed infringement. From 1982-1988, the Federal
Circuit found infringement 56% of the time and no infringement about 35% of the time. From
1988-1994, the percentage declined to 48% for infringement, while the percentage for nonin-
fringement increased to 45%. Id.
164 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd, Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical
Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). The decision on remand was Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-
Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying the Supreme Court's narrowed version
of the doctrine of equivalents).
165 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United
States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent."). Since the claims define the metes and bounds of an invention,
literal infringement under section 271 requires literal copying of every element in a particular
patent claim. See, e.g., Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) ("It is the claim that sets the metes and bounds of the invention entitled to the protec-
tion of the patent system."). Courts have held that restricting the enforcement of patent tights to
only those cases where the patent was literally infringed would allow copyists to unfairly limit
[Vol. 49:509
PATENT "MONOPOLYPHOBIA"
contested debate over the use and viability of the doctrine of equiva-
lents. It is no accident that scholars and jurists who view patents as
merely creating limited monopolies also advocate narrowing or
eliminating this equitable doctrine. 166
Hilton Davis and Warner-Jenkinson manufactured dyes used in
the food, drug and cosmetic industries. 167 Although both simultane-
ously worked on a dye purification process that eliminated the expen-
sive salting-out step, Hilton Davis was first to patent an ultra-fitration
process. In its patent, Hilton Davis claimed a process to be operated
at a pH of approximately 6.0-9.0. The upper pH limit was added in a
patent amendment to overcome prior art, but there was no explanation
in the patent specification or file concerning the lower limit.168 Un-
aware of the Hilton patent, Warner-Jenkinson implemented its own
ultra-filtration process that operated at a pH of five. Hilton Davis
immediately sued Warner-Jenkinson for patent infringement. Ac-
knowledging that a pH of 5.0 went beyond the literal language of the
claims, Hilton Davis's claim went forward solely under the doctrine
of equivalents.169
The district court case resulted in a jury finding the patent valid
and infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. 170  The jury also
found there was no willful infringement and accordingly adjusted the
damage award. 171 The federal circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed the
infringement issue only. In its appeal, Warner-Jenkinson argued that
the doctrine of equivalents was an equitable remedy available only
upon a suitable showing of the equities and an issue of law for the
court. 172 A fractured bench issued a majority opinion with one concur-
ring opinion and three separate dissents. 173
the patentee's right to protect against insubstantial changes. Thus, the doctrine of equivalents
evolved to find infringement in the instance of such insubstantial changes. The case most fre-
quently cited for establishing the doctrine is Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
Graver Tank modernized the doctrine by articulating the function, way and result rule. See
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) ("[A] patentee
may invoke this doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device if it performs substantially
the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result").
166 See, e.g., Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1541-43 (Plager, Archer, Rich, and Lourie, JJ., dis-
senting); Allan N. Littman, Restoring the Balance to Our Patent System, 37 IDEA: J.L. &
TECH. 545 (1997).
167 See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1515.
168 See id.
169 See id. at 1515-16.
'
70 See id. at 1516.
171 See id. at 1516.
172 See id. at 1525. This argument is based on the scholarly view that the doctrine of
equivalents is an equitable rather than legal doctrine and should be reserved for those compel-
ling circumstances where "unclean hands" or other equitable considerations mandate its appli-
cation by the judge. Under this view, the jury should never determine equivalence. See id. at
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The majority and concurring opinions validated the doctrine of
equivalents as an essential supplement to the literal infringement
analysis of section 271 and a question of fact for the jury. 174 They
supplemented the tripartite function, way and result test of Graver
Tank with the "insubstantial differences" test. 175 According to the
court, additional evidence to consider when evaluating the substanti-
ality of the differences includes: 1) function, way, result; 176 2) copy-
ing; 3) designing around; 4) existing knowledge of interchangeability;
and 5) independent development. 177
Both the majority and concurring opinions lack any reference to
patents as monopolies. Instead, Judge Newman's concurrence advo-
cates evaluating patent rights from a public interest aspect, analyzing
how broadly evaluating infringement to include both literal and in-
substantially different equivalents positively impacts technological
innovation. 78  She notes that "It]he principle of equivalency thus
serves a commercial purpose, as it adjusts the relationship between
the originator and the second-comer who bore neither the burden of
creation nor the risk of failure." 179 She cites a series of patent schol-
ars and economists who substantiate that commercializing patents
stimulates innovation. 18 Judge Newman extends the thesis to the
doctrine of equivalents, arguing that enlarging the value of the patent
to the innovator also increases the net social value and serves as a
risk-reducing factor in commercial investment.181 She concludes by
recommending that the patent bar and judiciary confer to convince
1539 (Plager, J., dissenting) (noting that the doctrine of equivalents is a judge made exception to
the Patent Act and must be used sparingly by the courts when equity demands).
171 See id. at 1512.
174 See id. at 1527, 1529.
175 See id. at 1519-20. Under the insubstantial differences test the alleged infringing device
is compared to the patented device to determine if they are substantially different. If there are
only insubstantial differences then the device is infringing under the doctrine of equivalents. See
id. The court also noted that in certain cases the insubstantial differences test would be supple-
mented with "other evidence relevant to the substantiality of the differences" such as known
interchangeability and/or copying. Id. at 1519.
176 See id. at 1522 (noting that often the function, way and result test may be enough to es-
tablish insubstantial differences).
177 See id. at 1519-20.
178 See id. at 1529-31 (Newman, J., concurring).
179 See id. at 1531.
1so See id.
'8' See id. at 1533. Judge Newman cites numerous sources to support her thesis, including
Zvi Griliches. Id. at 1531. Recall that Griliches refuses to acknowledge the conclusive evidence
regarding the impact of patent protection on gross domestic product and innovation. See supra
note 73. See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 29 (discussing whether patent
protection provides incentive for cumulative research). Judge Newman also notes that with
high-research costs industries tend to be more dependent on the patent system as an innovation
device. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1533 (Newman, J., concurring).
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Congress to codify the doctrine of equivalents, thereby eliminating
some of the uncertainty surrounding the doctrine.
182
In sharp contrast to Judge Newman's concurrence, Judge Plager's
dissent laboriously argued that the majority's broad application of the
doctrine of equivalents undermines the constitutional mandate of pat-
ent law and unlawfully extends this limited monopoly.
18 3
The Supreme Court had the final say by affirming that the doctrine
of equivalents is indeed a viable legal doctrine that supplements the
literal infringement analysis. 84 Unfortunately, however, the Court
182 Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1535-36 (Newman, J., concurring) ("It is not the doctrine of
equivalents, but the uncertainty of its application, that causes the uncertainty in commercial
relationships.... [a] statutory system that could accommodate the major factual scenarios of
technologic equivalency could provide added certainty both to patentees and to those seeking to
build on the subject matter of the patent.").
183 Id. at 1539-45 (Plager, J., dissenting). The dissenters argued that preserving the doctrine
and placing it in the domain of the jury would lead to an improper expansion of claim scope,
with the late Judge Helen Nies opining that she could reconcile the doctrine if it were applied to
each element of the claim, rather than to the accused product as a whole. See id. at 1574 (Nies,
J., dissenting). Many also argued that the doctrine itself directly conflicted with the Patent Act
of 1952 and should be abolished by the Court. Id. at 1578-79 (Nies, J., dissenting).
At issue for the dissent and many scholars is section 112's public notice disclosure re-
quirements which define the "metes and bounds of the claims." Arguably, extending infringe-
ment beyond the literal language of the claim creates tension with having claims disclose the
invention and delineate what remains in the public domain. I posit, however, that the majority
correctly indicated that since this is an equitable doctrine, considering factors such as 1) inter-
changeability; 2) function, way, result; 3) evidence of copying; 4) designing around and 5)
evidence of independent development helps preserve the balance between protecting the inven-
tor's patent property and leaving unearned property rights in the public domain. Moreover, the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel farther serves to ensure that the patentee will not be
able to recapture that which she acknowledged or placed back in the public domain during
prosecution. As pointed out by my colleague Craig Nard, the reality of inartful claims drafting
and the inherent ambiguities of language exacerbate the section 112/DOE tension. Nonetheless,
I believe that these are compelling reasons to have an infringement analysis that goes beyond
the literal language of the claims.
Several commentators have supported the dissenters' position. See Jonathon Taylor Reavill,
Tipping the Balance: Hilton Davis and the Shape of Equity in the Doctrine of Equivalents, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 319 (1996) (arguing that the judge should determine whether to apply
the doctrine of equivalents); Joseph F. Haag, Comment, Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warer-
Jenkinson Co.: An Equitable Solution to the Uncertainty Behind the Doctrine of Equivalents, 80
MINN. L. REv. 1511 (1996) (asserting that courts should exclude evidence of copying, design-
ing around, and independent development); Jeff Kuehnle, Note, Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co.: Opening the Floodgates on Nonliteral Patent Infringement Through the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 589 (1996) (arguing for judicial control of the
doctrine of equivalents). But see Toshiko Takenaka, Doctrine of Equivalents After Hilton Davis:
A Comparative Law Analysis, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 479 (1996) (saluting the
federal circuit majority for aligning U.S. patent claim interpretation with that of other jurisdic-
tions).
184 See Warer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). The peti-
tioners argued that the 1952 Patent Act conflicts with the doctrine of equivalents and thus
should be abolished by the Supreme Court. See Brief for Petitioner at 13, Warner-Jenkinson Co.
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (No. 95-728). Alternatively, petitioners adopted
the view of the dissenters in the Federal Circuit that at a minimum the Court should severely
narrow the doctrine and limit it to compelling equitable circumstances. See id. at 31. The brief
cites several Supreme Court cases where the Court takes a narrow, "monopolyphobic" view of
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was unwilling to fully embrace the appellate court's broad view of the
doctrine and rendered an opinion heavily focusing on the tension
between the DOE and the notice function of the
claims/specification. 8 5  Adopting the view of the dissenters in the
Federal Circuit, it noted that the DOE "has taken on a life of its own
... [and] when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and
public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement."18 6 The
Court then held that the insubstantial differences test outlined by the
Federal Circuit must be evaluated under an element-by-element
analysis of the claims.187
The Court further narrowed the doctrine of equivalents by estab-
lishing that where the prosecution history or "file-wrapper" is silent
concerning the purpose for an amendment limiting a claim element,
the court should presume that the amendment related to patentability
and is therefore barred by prosecution history estoppel.18 To avoid
the patent right and/or doctrine of equivalents. See id. at 20-24. Indeed, the petitioner's brief is
replete with references to the patent right as a monopoly. See, e.g., id. at 20 ("'[Patentee must]
inform the public.., of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which
features may be safely used or manufactured without a license and which may not.') (quoting
Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931)); Id. at 21 ("[The quid pro quo for the
patent monopoly is 'precision of disclosure,' which is needed 'to warn the industry concerned of
the precise scope of the monopoly asserted."') (quoting Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil &
Refining Co., 32 U.S. 471,484 (1944)); Id. at 24 (stating that a legal monopoly "has long been
treated as 'anomalous' in our legal system") (citing Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univ.
of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 342-43 (1971)).
185 See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30-37.
116 Id. at 28-29.
is7 See id. at 29 ("Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining
the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to
individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole."). The Federal Circuit origi-
nated the element-by-element test in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931
(Fed. Cir. 1987). Here, the Federal Circuit established that the doctrine of equivalents required
an element-by-element comparison in order to determine whether there was an equivalent for
each element. See id. at 934. In the years following Pennwalt, some argued that the Federal
Circuit inconsistently applied the all-element test, and in some cases abolished it all together.
See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Unites States, 148 F.3d 1384, 1385-86 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Cleveger, J., dissenting); see also Rudolph P. Hoffman, Jr., The Doctrine of Equivalents:
Tvelve Years of Federal Circuit Precedent Still Leaves Practitioners Wondering, 20 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1033, 1060 (1994) (noting that the application of the doctrine of equivalents
remains uncertain).
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court failed to provide a complete test for equivalence
and left this to the expertise of the Federal Circuit.
With these limiting principles as a backdrop, we see no purpose in going further and
micro-managing the Federal Circuit's particular word choice for analyzing equiva-
lence. We expect that the Federal Circuit will refine the formulation of the test for
equivalence in the orderly course of case-by-case determinations and we leave such
refinement to that court's soundjudgement in this area of its special expertise.
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
188 See id. at 34. Under the doctrine of prosecution history or file wrapper estoppel, limita-
tions added to a claim during patent prosecution may create a bar to recapturing the broader
limitation later under the doctrine of equivalents. Prior to the Supreme Court opinion, prosecu-
tion history estoppel could only create a bar if the limitation was expressly added to overcome
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the estoppel, the patentee must establish an alternative reason for the
amendment. 189
In Hilton Davis, the Court consciously sought to balance the
property rights of the inventor against the public's right to public do-
main information. However, the opinion also illustrates the potential
pitfalls from evaluating the patent right from an anticompetitive mo-
nopoly perspective. Categorizing patents as property circumvents the
negative presumption surrounding the term "patent monopoly," which
prevailed during the second cycle of judicial hostility toward patents,
and which periodically surfaces when courts seek to narrow patent
rights. 190 The next section illustrates how the various cycles of judi-
cial hostility negatively impacted patent application filings, which, in
turn, negatively impacted economic growth to some degree.
B. Judicial Enforcement of Patents, Relation to Patent Application
Proportions and Economic Growth
If U.S. industries are to remain competitive in world mar-
kets, our laws should not inhibit invention and innovation;
rather, they should nurture and encourage them.191
The suggestion that there have been cyclic variations in the
level of American inventiveness has been rejected more be-
the prior art. The lower court acknowledged in its opinion that prosecution history estoppel can
limit application of the DOE. See id However, the Supreme Court went one step further in its
presumption, by placing an additional burden on the patentee to establish an alternative reason
for any amendment that was not required to overcome the prior art cited by the Examiner. See
id. at 33. In Hilton Davis, all parties agreed that only the upper pH limitation of 9.0 was neces-
sary to overcome the prior art, see id. at 32; thus, prosecution history estoppel clearly barred
Hilton Davis from claiming equivalents at pH ranges close to 9.0. However, the lower limita-
tion of 5.0 was not made in response to the prior art rejection and fell outside the scope of the
prior art. Therefore, without the presumption, prosecution history estoppel could not bar the
court's application of the DOE. This was the holding below. See Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
189 See id. at 34. Hilton Davis was reversed and remanded specifically on this ground for
the lower courts to apply the prosecution history estoppel presumption and provide Hilton Davis
the opportunity to establish that the limitation of a 6.0 pH was not related to patentability. In
fact, the Federal Circuit has heard the case on remand and recently remanded it to the district
court to determine this issue. See Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114
F.3d 1161,1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
190 See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Co., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965) (A patent "is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to
access to a free and open market.") (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive
Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)); United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle,
670 F.2d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Such a grant is in inevitable tension with the general
hostility against monopoly expressed in the antitrust laws.").
191 Ira M. Millstein, The Role of Antitrust in an Age of Technology, 9 CARDozO L. REV.
1175,1176 (1988).
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cause of failure to discover any evidence supporting the sug-
gestion than in the light of evidence rebutting it.192
The 1996 FTC's Competition Policy Report notes that "[r]esearch-
intensive industries, such as the computer, semiconductor, software,
communications, aerospace, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments,
and chemicals industry, have grown at an average of twice the rate of
growth in real GDP from 1972-1992."' 93 The report also cites evi-
dence suggesting that both intellectual property protection and com-
petition are important to spur such innovation. 194 Unfortunately, few
legal scholars and economists have researched and clearly docu-
mented the nexus between patents and technological innovation in the
United States. 195 Indeed, Edwin Mansfield has emphasized that,
"[g]iven the age and prominence of the patent system, it is surprising
how little is known about its effects on the rate of innovation."
196
Mayers, in his 1957 piece, stated that public sentiment had some ef-
fect on the cyclical judicial hostility toward patents, but also argued
that factors such as cyclical inefficiency of the administration at the
patent office and reexamination laws equally influence the trend. 97
Similarly, Zvi Griliches argues that "patent numbers are an imperfect
index of inventive output. . . . [with] patent numbers leav[ing] us
where we began, with a suggestive but possibly misleading puz-
zle."'198
This section documents preliminary research conducted to evalu-
ate the relationship between the cyclical judicial hostility towards pat-
ents, the number of patent applications filed and gross domestic prod-
192 Mayers, supra note 86, at 51.
193 FTC Competition Policy Report (visited Feb. 17, 1999) <http:llwww.antitrustorgllawl
comp.Policy/contents.htm>, ch. 1(B)(1).
194 See id. ch. 8. The report also notes that patents may have an anticompetitive effect if
used in violation of antitrust laws as in illegal tying monopolies, cross licensing schemes etc., or
if the PTO issues an overly broad patent grant. Id.
195 Scholars have conducted industry-specific research as well as research on smaller coun-
tries, to conclude that intellectual property rights do play a role in economic growth. These
scholars have concluded that countries with strong intellectual property protection have stronger
economies and technological innovation. See, e.g., Gould & Gruben, supra note 73 (comparing
intellectual property rights in various countries); Narin & Noma, supra note 72 (examining the
correlation between patents and corporate technological strength in the pharmaceutical indus-
try).
196 Mansfield, supra note 18, at 173. Mansfield conducted a limited empirical study of 100
random U.S. manufacturers to support his thesis that patent protection does positively impact
innovation. He notes that the drop in propensity to patent in the late 1960s and 1970s may be
attributable to a decline in the annual number of patents granted to U.S. inventors. See id. at
178-79.
197 See Mayers, supra note 86, at 36-41, 43-46.
198 Griliches, supra note 72, at 319.
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uct (GDP).199 There appears to be some nexus between cyclical judi-
cial hostility and the level of inventiveness that ultimately impacts
economic growth (as reflected in GDP).200 For instance, there is a
substantial Pearson's correlation between cyclical judicial hostility
and number of applications filed, and there is also a significant Pear-
son's correlation between patents filed and GDP. It was more diffi-
cult, however, to establish a clear cause-and-effect relationship be-
tween patents adjudicated, patents filed and GDP. This is not sur-
prising since productivity via innovation is one of several components
that determine growth of GDP.2°' Thus, more detailed economic
analysis is required to establish conclusively the cause-and-effect re-
lationship. Nonetheless, it is possible to utilize the rank correlation
technique to substantiate that there is a direct relationship between
patents adjudicated, patents filed and GDP.202 This synergy presents
plausible evidence that society's attitude toward intellectual property,
and patents in particular, plays a significant causative role in driving
inventiveness, which ultimately impacts economic growth. °3
As noted in the previous section, Figure 1 and Table 1 represent a
statistical analysis of appellate cases to determine the percent of adju-
dicated patents held valid during the periods of 1891-1993.2 4  For
statistical purposes, a case was adjudicated valid if any single claim
of the patent was held valid and infringed.2 5 Alternatively, any cases
199 1 chose gross domestic product over gross private domestic investment since I am only
investigating a trend and a possible cause-and-effect link between patent protection and eco-
nomic growth. I encourage economists to follow up on this data with the proper logarithmic
analysis to further verify the relationships, particularly with reference to gross domestic invest-
ment
200 In fact, it was patent instability (caused by non-uniformity and forum shopping) which
led to the formation of the Federal Circuit. See supra notes 16,1-63 and accompanying text.
201 Specifically, GDP results from several variables, including but not limited to, such fac-
tors as savings rate, exchange rate, savings, income, and governmental policy.
202 The rank correlation technique is useful when one or more variables in question can not
be measured in an ordinary way. The range utilized is from +1 to -1. A positive rank correlation
suggests that the variables are directly related, while a negative one suggests that they are in-
versely related. The two extremes represent a perfect direct or inverse relationship, respectively.
Statistical independence would have a rank correlation coefficient of zero.
203 One flaw in the analysis was using total application numbers and comparing these to na-
tional GDP without breaking it down by industry. Mansfield and Griliches, in their studies,
compared patent applications/grants by key industry to industry specific GDP data. See Mans-
field, supra note 18; Griliches, supra note 73. Neither study has added into the analysis the
tracking of individual cases in which patents were held invalid. My next paper will attempt to
link the three, through a focus on the pharmaceutical industry.
204 The percentage of patents held valid was determined by dividing the number of cases in
which a patent was held valid by the total number of cases in which validity was determined,
then multiplied by one hundred. For the years preceding 1957, case data was obtained from the
Mayers paper, supra note 86, and was available as totals per multi-year period. Donald Dunner
graciously supplied data for the years 1982-1994. See Dunner et al., supra note 17, at 153.
20s For example, see Mayers, supra note 86, at 34, stating:
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holding a patent not infringed without considering validity was dis-
carded from the analysis. Clearly, the most troublesome cycle of ju-
dicial hostility occured from the mid-1930s through the 1950s. Fig-
ure 1 shows a substantial drop in validity findings during the Court's
"anti-patent" bias, fueled by the Sherman Act and the Court's belief
that all patents were anticompetitive monopolies.
Similarly, it is no coincidence that within a short period of time
following the Loew's presumption that patents automatically confer
market power and thus are 'per se' restraints on trade, we entered an-
other cycle of judicial hostility towards patents. As seen in Figure 1,
after a brief upswing of validity determination in the early 1960s, a
series of dips in validity findings occurs through the 1970s. Com-
paring this dip to the dip occurring after the patent misuse cases (de-
cided in the 1930s and 1940s) strengthens the thesis that when the
judiciary view patents as anticompetitive limited monopolies, they
narrowly evaluate patents and are less inclined to find the patent right
valid and enforceable.
Figure l a further illustrates the negative impact of the cyclical ju-
dicial hostility towards patents. It compares the total patents adjudi-
cated with the percent held valid between 1891-1992. The graph il-
lustrates a significant positive relationship between the total number
of patent cases adjudicated and the numbers of patents that are held
valid. In light of the data reflected in Figure 1, a plausible explana-
tion for this correlation is that during cycles of judicial hostility pat-
entees are reluctant to appeal findings of invalidity. Thus, the de-
crease in total validity adjudications during a period of minimal per-
cent validity findings may indicate a higher litigation threshold for a
patent-owning business. A business having a bad experience at-
tempting to enforce a patent may be reluctant to enforce its other pat-
ents unless the chances of success start increasing. During a period
when courts are hostile towards patents and find a low percentage
valid, many patentees will become litigation-averse and will decline
to enforce patent rights in court for fear of an invalidity finding. This
results in a drop in infringement filings and a decrease in total validity
adjudications. 206
[A] decision holding any claim of a patent valid shall be counted as favorable to the
patent.., even though some or all claims may have been held not infringed. This is
on the rationalization that a holding of partial validity, without more, recognizes the
presence of invention in the questioned patent and promises the patentee pro tanto
judicial protection, regardless of further holdings on collateral issues.
Id.
206 My research assistant Eric Kron pointed out another explanation for the similarity in
trends between patents adjudicated and percent held valid. He notes that the trend may be an
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Yet, although legal scholars have explored the various cycles of
hostility, a clear consensus that judicial sentiment toward patents di-
rectly and significantly impacts the variances in validity determina-
tions is still lacking.2 7 As substantiated by the case analysis, how-
ever, negatively viewing patents as monopolies was a key factor be-
hind each dip. Other factors that are more difficult to document and
measure included variances in examiner proficiency, productivity at
the PTO, and the reexamination and reissue proceedings. 2 8 Unfortu-
nately, the patent validity data is somewhat imperfect since it fails to
include cases of patent infringement where validity was not raised as
a defense. However, since validity is an issue in the overwhelming
majority of cases, this impurity does not affect the ability of this data
to signal and measure each "monopolyphobic" cycle.209
artificial creation of the criteria used to select which cases are validity adjudications. He made
several intriguing observations. Cases in which a patent is expressly declared valid are consid-
ered validity adjudications. Additionally, cases where patents are held infringed are also con-
sidered validity adjudications, based on the logic that if a patent is held infringed then the patent
must be valid. Furthermore, cases in which patents are expressly held invalid are counted as
invalidity adjudications. However, cases where patents are held not infringed are not counted as
invalidity adjudications because the issue of validity may not have been reached. Thus, two
categories of holdings that are beneficial to the patentee are considered validity adjudications:
express declarations of patent validity and findings of infringement. Conversely, only one cate-
gory of holding that is hostile to the patentee is counted as an invalidity adjudication: express
declarations of patent invalidity. Although the appellate court may express hostility toward
patents by refusing to find infringement, this type of hostility appears to be excluded from the
invalidity adjudication. Thus, during a hostility period it may appear as if the total number of
validity adjucations decreased from a time when the court was friendly toward patents. He
posits that in this hypothetical, the decrease is explained by the fact that findings of infringe-
ment are counted as validity adjudications, whereas findings of non-infringement are not.
My response is that because the overwhelming majority of cases include the invalidity de-
fense and validity adjudication, the few cases where non-infringement is found without a valid-
ity determination do not significantly impact the trend. Nonetheless, I concede this is a valid
point that presents food for thought in this area.
m See, e.g., Mayers, supra note 86 at 50-51. Mayers cautiously concludes that the evi-
dence supports a correlation between the data on patent validity determinations and cyclical
public sentiment toward industrial manufacturers and the patent right. He notes, however, that
we still need to explore other dominant causes for the cycles, such as cyclical inefficiency of the
PTO. "The suggestion that there have been cyclic variations in the level of American inven-
tiveness has been rejected more because of failure to discover any evidence supporting the sug-
gestion than in the light of evidence rebutting it." Id. at 51.
In contrast, Zvi Griliches is unwilling to accept even Mayers's basic thesis; he argues that
the impact of the PTO is far more significant than public sentiment/judicial hostility. See gener-
ally Griliches, supra note 72, at 298-99 (arguing that rising opportunity costs at the PTO nega-
tively impacts independent patent applications).
2o8 See Mayers, supra note 86, at 36-37, 43-46; see also Griliches, supra note 72, at 295
(arguing that examiners are taking longer to complete the application process due to the rising
comlxity of the applications).
20 Another source of impurity is that most patent cases involve multiple claims. For
counting purposes, in a multiple claim case, if at least one claim was held valid, the entire case
was considered valid. The theory is that the single claim was enough to commercially exploit
the invention commercially.
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Next, we evaluated how the cyclical judicial hostility toward pat-
ents affected inventors and filings of applications in the PTO. In
other words, did any particular cycle of judicial hostility affect the
subsequent desire of inventors to seek patent protection? Figure 2
and Table 2 include both the percent of adjudicated patents held valid
and the number of patent applications filed for the years 1925-1993.
In general, the curves appear to follow similar trends.210 Upon close
inspection, however, we noted some interesting differences.
First, between 1925 and 1946 there is a more direct correlation and
the curves mirror each other, with a sharper decrease in patent appli-
cations filed right after the Great Depression and World War II.
Similarly, during World War II, when there was an economic boom,
there is a sharp upswing in the number of applications filed.
Severe economic shifts thus appear to have a greater impact on
applications filed than validity adjudication. 211 This may be expected,
since investments by private industry are far more sensitive to eco-
nomic swings than to the attitudes of the judiciary. For example, a
severe downturn in the economy leads to cost-cutting by private in-
dustry in order to maintain profitability. Often, research and devel-
opment monies used to fund patent procurement are included in the
cuts, thereby negatively impacting the number of applications filed
during such a downturn. As a result, there is less activity in the inva-
lidity curve during periods of sharp economic swings.
Second, after the formation of the Federal Circuit the number of
patent applications filed increased dramatically. Patentees appeared
to believe that this Circuit possessed the technical expertise to evalu-
ate patentability during the prosecution stage and would consistently
and equitably evaluate appeals from the Patent Office. Interestingly,
the minor recession suffered in the 1980s had little impact on the
number of applications filed. This may suggest that public sentiment
about patents and/or the prosecution process more significantly im-
pacts changes in applications filed, rather than economics, unless
there is a severe economic shift.
Third, a close inspection of the antitrust cycle (1937-1959) of pat-
ent "monopolyphobia" appears to strengthen the position that judicial
210 The Pearson's correlation number for percent valid vs. percent change in applications is
0.47 for the time period 1960-1993. Identical data bears a Pearson's correlation of 1.0, with
negative correlations ranging from -.9999 through -1.0. Thus, a + 0.47 Pearson's correlation
seems to indicate, as the curves indicate, a somewhat direct nexus between percent valid and
percentage change in applications filed.
21, It would be interesting to pursue further studies on whether the number of infringement
suits filed increased during periods of recession/depression. Arguably, reducing research and
development expenditures may motivate more firms to copy existing patented technology,
rather than invent their own.
[Vol. 49:509
PATENT "MONOPOLYPHOBIA"
hostility significantly affects validity adjudication, which in turn im-
pacts applications filed.212 During this cycle, the judiciary was openly
hostile towards patents, strictly evaluated validity and held numerous
patents invalid. This ultimately led to reduced confidence in the
courts and reductions in the number of patent applications filed.
To statistically substantiate our visual evaluation of the relation-
ship between the data, we ran Pearson's correlation, rank correlation
and T-test confidence calculations to evaluate the relationships among
patents adjudicated on appeal, patent application filings and GDP.1 3
Table 2 notes a rank correlation of .660 and a Pearson's correlation of
.646 between adjudication of patents held valid and patent applica-
tions filed. Since these numbers are both approaching +1.0, they ap-
pear to indicate evidence of a direct relationship between the two
variables being compared.
As seen in Table 5, an even stronger statistical correlation is
found between percent change in GDP and percent change in patent
applications filed. Figure 3 appears to indicate a direct relationship
between patents adjudicated, patents filed and GDP. Tables 3 and 4
indicate a rank correlation of .944 and Pearson's correlation of .887
between patent applications filed and GDP. These measures indicate
that these calculations are not statistically independent. Moreover,
Table 3 also shows excellent T-test confidence indicators of 16.387
and 11.042, which supports the theses that this Article has ad-
vanced.2 14
Our statistical analysis fails to substantiate which set of data es-
tablishes cause and effect. However, a visual inspection of Figure 3
212 As expected, because the number of patents filed is several orders of magnitude greater
than the number of infringement cases adjudicated on the appellate level, the percent valid curve
is more sensitive than patents filed.
213 Pearson's correlation is a preferred function to compare data sets to evaluate how direct
the correlation is between data. It is an estimate of the population correlation coefficient. See
AMIR D. AczEL, COMIIErE BusINEss STATISTICS 438 (3d ed. 1996). When two data sets are
compared using a Pearson's function, the output can range from -I to +1. lm. at 436. A Pear-
son's correlation coefficient of +1 means there is a perfect and positive linear relationship be-
tween the two variables such that whenever one variable increases, the other variable also in-
creases. Id. Similarly, a Pearson's correlation coefficient of-1 indicates there is a perfect and
negative linear relationship between the two variables such that whenever one variable in-
creases, the other one decreases. Id.
On rank correlation technique, see supra note 202.
Finally, the T-test confidence interval measures the probability that a range of values (an
interval) contains a given parameter (or value). See ACZEI, supra, at 208. The t-distribution is
distinguished from the standard z-distribution by the fact that the population standard deviation
(a) is unknown. Id. at 217.
214 Since innovation and patent investments comprise percentages of the GDP calculation, it
is difficult to obtain a +1 Pearson's or rank correlation figure. See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe, Trends
and Patterns in Research and Development Expenditures in the U.S., 93 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
SCL USA 12658, 12658 (1996) (noting that in 1994, $169.6 billion was spent on R & D expen-
ditures, which was 2.5% of gross domestic product).
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seems to indicate that judicial hostility may cause a reduction in pat-
ent filings which then negatively impacts GDP, to some degree. Ed-
win Mansfield, in an industry by industry comparison of patents
granted against GDP concluded that in industries such as pharmaceu-
ticals and chemicals, which rely heavily on patents for intellectual
property protection, patent procurement did increase the rate of inno-
vation and had a substantial impact on the industry.215 Economist
Francis Narin also substantiated that patents are indicators of corpo-
rate technological strength in the pharmaceutical industry. 6 Narin
found correlations of 0.82 between expert opinion of pharmaceutical
company technical strength and the number of U.S. patents granted to
the companies.217 He further found correlations in the general range
of 0.6 to 0.9 between increases in company profits and sales, and both
patent citation frequency and concentration of company patents
within a few patent classes.218
This research is preliminary and not meant to establish conclu-
sively that patent filings or procurement drive economic growth. At a
minimum, however, this data substantiates that patent filings, along
with judicial views, impact economic growth to some degree. In light
of this synergy, courts should carefully consider how patents are
characterized and avoid utilizing terms like "monopoly" which re-
strict a fair and expansive evaluation of patent rights. Instead, to en-
hance this synergistic relationship, the patent right should more prop-
erly be viewed as property.
I[I. COURTS AND CONGRESS SHOULD VIEW PATENTS AS PROPERTY
"In considering patent matters and question, letters patent should
be viewed in the same light as a land grant, should never be termed,
be accorded the same treatment as other forms of property, and
should always be referred to or designated as a patent grant. " 219
Like trademark rights, patent property rights are readily supported
under a utilitarian approach. In this view, property is viewed as a
"man-made social institution and means of organization, whose un-
derlying goal is wealth maximization while balancing the relative so-
215 See Mansfield, supra note 18. Mansfield also concludes, however, that he can not make
the same empirical conclusion for other industries such as primary metals, electrical equipment
and motor vehicles, which rely much less on patent protection. See id. at 180. Harvard econo-
mist Zvi Griliches similarly concludes that the data is inconclusive concerning the overall posi-
tive impact of innovation (patent procurement) on GDP. See Griliches, supra note 72, at 303.
216 See Narin et al., supra note 72.
217 See id. at 150.
218 See id. at 150, tbl. 6.
219 Kitch, supra note 24, at 32 (citation omitted).
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cial costs."' ' 0 Posner utilizes the utilitarian approach and broadly de-
fines the property right as any "legally enforceable power to exclude
others from using a resource, without need to contract with them."22'
The patent right fits squarely within the Posnerian property paradigm,
which acknowledges that intellectual property rights include both the
static benefit of preventing overuse of the resource and the dynamic
benefit of providing an incentive to create or improve upon existing
resources. 
2
n
Many provisions of federal patent law can be seen as advancing
such a benefit to the patentee. The twenty-year right to exclude oth-
ers from making, using and selling the patented product or process
provides a reward and incentive to create useful property. The patent
claims provide specific property boundaries, 223 while the specification
enhances the description of what is claimed. The statutory disclosure
and enabling requirements224 ensure that other inventors can use the
patented information as building blocks for new and improved de-
vices. Furthermore, the limitations of novelty and non-obviousness
prohibit duplicating property already in the public domain, thereby
meeting the static benefit of preventing overuse of existing re-
sources. 225 Moreover, the PTO examination process and judicial en-
forcement of patents provide additional means of limiting the breadth
and scope of patentable subject matter. Thus, the patent right un-
questionably provides benefit; the question remains, at what cost?
Landes and Posner note that there are four costs associated with
patent property: (1) transfer cost; (2) rent seeking-the cost incurred
by duplicative research and development in identical inventions; (3)
protection and enforcement; and (4) social "cost of restricting the use
of property when it has a public-good character."226 They posit that
intellectual property rights have particularly high costs that mandate
limiting them in ways that other property rights are not.227 For pat-
o Rose, supra note 9, at 123 n.128 (citing JESSE DUKEMINER & JAMES E. KRIER,
PROPERTY 56-57 (3d ed. 1993)) ("This view is without a doubt, the dominant view of property
today, at least among lawyers and especially among those working in law and economics.").
21 William Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L.
& EcON. 265,266 (1987).
2n See id.
223 Of course, the ambiguities surrounding language creates difficulties regarding the
claims' setting of clear boundaries. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently held that claim inter-
pretation is not a question of fact for the jury, but is instead a question of law. See Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,387 (1996).
224 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
225 See, e.g., Dam, supra note 39, at 266 ("It [the non-obviousness requirement] sharply
limits the littering of the innovation landscape with land mines consisting of patents on what
those skilled in the trade would assume to be in the public domain.").
2M Landes & Posner, supra note 221, at 267.22
' See id. at 268.
1999]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ents, many of the same benefit-producing provisions also help to re-
duce such costs. The novelty and non-obvious requirements and the
twenty-year term limitation meet this goal with provisions requiring
enabling disclosures, clearly defined claims s and early filing; these
requirements contribute to minimizing cost.229 The right to exclude
others from making, using and selling provides the commercializing
inventor with a cost advantage that allows her to reap greater profits,
resulting in increased production rather than restriction of socially
beneficial products. Novelty and non-obviousness weed out discov-
eries that lack contribution and properly belong in the public domain,
thereby minimizing economic rents.2 30 The Patent Act and Patent
Manual of Examining Procedure provide an elaborate network of law
and administrative guidelines that minimize the cost of patent pro-
curement and enforcement.231 Finally, a balanced judicial attitude
toward patents minimizes rent dissipation by ensuring that the patent
property lines are equitably drawn under both the literal infringement
and doctrine of equivalents analyses.2
32
The irrational fear that broadly protecting patent rights impedes
free market competition entices courts and scholars to view patents
erroneously as anticompetitive monopolies. Yet, some argue that
cyclical judicial hostility is a necessary evil since it swings the pen-
dulum away from rewarding inventors at the expense of the public
and back toward free market competition. 33 During periods of in-
creased findings of invalidity, more public good property is returned
228 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
229 See Dam, supra note 39, at 258.
230 See id. at 263.
231 See id. at 262 (noting that any property system has an associated administrative cost, but
absent an interference proceeding, "the cost per patent is relatively modest"). Dam concedes,
however, that the high costs of litigation in the United States create a substantial cost for judicial
enforcement of patent rights in infringement cases, but that court costs would be associated with
enforcing any property right. See id.
232 See Grady & Alexander, supra note 74, at 308 (advocating the rent dissipation theory of
judicial enforcement of patents). According to Grady and Alexander, the courts serve the
unique role of minimizing rent dissipation by "granting protection broad enough to prevent a
race to improve on the telephone, but not so broad as to create wasteful races for other patent
goldmines." Id. The authors go on to argue that the cyclical nature of judicial enforcement is
the price we pay for minimizing rent dissipation. On this point, I disagree with their thesis,
since I believe that this view once again presumes that patents inherently confer market power
and create excessive economic rent.
23 See, e.g., Littman, supra note 166, at 545. Littman disfavors using economic arguments
to support broadly evaluating patent rights. He supports the need for multiple courts of appeal
for patent infringement cases, since the formation of the Federal Circuit has tipped the balances
in favor of patentees. Littman also cites several Federal Circuit opinions wherein the dissent
questioned whether the Federal Circuit has leaned too far toward patentees. See id. But see
HARMON, supra note 17, at 794 ("At the present time, I feel comfortable advising clients that
the patent enforcement pendulum is swinging toward a more neutral position, where it really
ought to be."); see also Grady & Alexander, supra note 74, at 310 ("[W]e theorize that the
courts have found ways of minimizing the problem that patents create.").
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to the public domain, thereby reducing the high cost associated with
the patent property right. However, this view contradicts the data
presented and the incentive theory behind the constitutionally-
mandated patent grant. Periods of judicial hostility toward patents
impede free market competition and limit economic growth. In re-
sponse to minimal patent enforcement, corporations reduce the num-
ber of patent filings by curtailing research and development or re-
sorting to trade secrets. Since a trade secret is never disclosed to the
public, the company now has a true, unlimited "monopoly" on infor-
mation. This negatively impacts our economy in two ways. First, a
reduction in patents limits disclosures available for future research
and development. Second, encouraging trade secret protection in-
creases a firm's ability to procure market power since competitors can
not access this secret information to create new and competitive
products or processes.
To maintain the appropriate balance, I propose amending the Pat-
ent Act to include an express definition of patents as property. M
Legislative history noting the problems of labeling patents as anti-
competitive monopolies would also be helpful. Ideally, revised sec-
tion 101 would expressly prohibit use of the term "monopoly" to de-
scribe the patent right. This would ensure that "monopoly" is re-
served for situations of patent misuse which violate antitrust provi-
sions and restrain trade.
Secondly, I propose codifying the doctrine of equivalents. This
would give additional congressional emphasis of patents as prop-
erty. 35 The concept mirrors the "fair use" provision of the Copyright
Act,236 wherein numerous factors are provided for courts to evaluate
fair use. Section 107 of the Copyright Act admonishes that fair use is
determined on a case-by-case basis with no single factor being dis-
positive of fair use.23 7 Similarly, amended section 271(d) of the Pat-
ent Act would add infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. It
24 As noted supra note 21, § 261 of the Patent Act refers to patents as "having the attrib-
utes of personal property." 15 U.S.C. § 261 (1994). I recommend affirmatively stating in sec-
tion 101 that patents are property.
235 1 hope that codification of the DOE also leads to a more consistent evaluation of how to
draw effective boundaries around a patentee's right based on what she has claimed, disclosed in
her invention, or stated during prosecution. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
236 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). Fair use is one of the enumerated exceptions to the exclusive
rights provided copyright owners under § 106 of the Copyright Act. The primary purpose of the
fair use doctrine is to provide for reproduction in copies for purposes such as research, com-
ment, teaching and scholarship. The factors which a court must consider in evaluating fair use
include: 1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. See id.217 See id.
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would also require an objective evaluation of several factors to de-
termine the substantiality of the differences between the accused and
patented devices.
The factors for determining insubstantial differences would be: 1)
function, way, result; 2) "whether persons reasonably skilled in the art
would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not
contained in the patent with one that was"; 3) evidence of copying; 4)
evidence of "designing around"; and 5) evidence of independent de-
velopment.238 Like Merges and Nelson, I would add a sixth factor:
evaluating the overall design improvement of the accused device.239
Section 271(d) should clarify that the determination of an "equiva-
lent" is made on a case-by-case basis with no single factor being dis-
positive of equivalence. 4 This ensures an equitable evaluation of the
patent "property" of the patentee, while balancing the competing in-
terest of encouraging new innovation without unfairly extending the
statutory boundaries of the patent right.
CONCLUSION
Viewing patents as property helps the Supreme Court, Federal
Circuit and district courts evaluate these rights in an equitable and
consistent manner. This enhances the synergy between patents
and industrial growth, thereby ensuring that we remain a "foun-
tainhead" of technological innovation in an era of ever-increasing
global competition.
238 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519-22 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (citations omitted), rev'd, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17
(1997).
239 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 12, at 910 ("The equivalents inquiry, even for a pio-
neer patent would be centered around whether the improved structures of the accused device
show major differences from the structures disclosed in the original specification."). This is
basically the Hilton Davis insubstantial differences test, but the authors add the following areas
to consider: "materials, change in number of components, greatly improved efficiency in indi-
vidual components .... overall design improvement." Id.
240 The legislative history should point out that consistent with Hilton Davis, there may be
times when function, way and result alone may establish equivalence. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d
at 1522.
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Table 1 - Percent of Adjudicated Patents Held Valid
Adjudi- Patents % Adjudi- Patents %
Year cated Valid Valid Year cated Valid Valid
1891 34
1892 34
1893 34
1894 34
1895 50.6
1896 50.6
1897 50.6
1898 50.6
1899 50.6
1900 50.6
1901 50.6
1902 50.6
1903 50.6
1904 50.6
1905 66.4
1906 66.4
1907 66.4
1908 66.4
1909 66.4
1910 66.8
1911 66.8
1912 66.8
1913 66.8
1914 66.8
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
16.25 47.79 1923
16.25 47.79 1924
16.25 47.79 1925
16.25 47.79 1926
22.8 45.06 1927
22.8 45.06 1928
22.8 45.06 1929
22.8 45.06 1930
22.8 45.06 1931
25.2 49.8 1932
25.2 49.8 1933
25.2 49.8 1934
25.2 49.8 1935
25.2 49.8 1936
34.6 52.11 1937
34.6 52.11 1938
34.6 52.11 1939
34.6 52.11 1940
34.6 52.11 1941
35.4 52.99 1942
35.4 52.99 1943
35.4 52.99 1944
35.4 52.99 1945
35.4 52.99 1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
116
116
116
116
116
124.6
124.6
124.6
124.6
124.6
74.2
74.2
74.2
74.2
74.2
98
98
98
98
98
41.4
41.4
41.4
41.4
41.4
57.6
57.6
57.6
57.6
57.6
58.4 50.34
58.4 50.34
58.4 50.34
58.4 50.34
58.4 50.34
54.6 43.82
54.6 43.82
54.6 43.82
54.6 43.82
54.6 43.82
24.2 32.61
24.2 32.61
24.2 32.61
24.2 32.61
24.2 32.61
21.2 21.63
21.2 21.63
21.2 21.63
21.2 21.63
21.2 21.63
11.4 27.54
11.4 27.54
11.4 27.54
11.4 27.54
11.4 27.54
16 27.54
16 27.54
16 27.54
16 27.54
16 27.54
1999]
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Adjudi- Patents %
Year cated Valid Valid
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
55.667
55.667
55.667
57
65
57
54
59
77
67
63
60
63
71
41
53
62
39
41
41
50
31
43
21
52
33
30.54
30.54
30.54
31.58
27.69
36.84
50
49.15
36.36
23.88
42.86
26.67
31.75
36.62
26.83
32.08
35.48
30.77
43.9
31.71
24
38.71
39.53
42.86
21.15
33.33
Adjudi- Patents %
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
cated
29
28
92
62
108
65
74
65
85
37
23
52
9
Valid
11
15
58
48
82
47
51
40
60
24
15
30
5
Valid
37.93
53.57
63.04
77.42
75.93
72.31
68.92
61.54
70.59
64.86
65.22
57.69
55.56
Data was unavailable for the years 1915-1924. Before the year 1958,
data was available only in four-year intervals; we averaged the values
for each four-year period.
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Table 2
Percent of Patents Held Valid and Patent Applications Per Year
% of Patents Patent
Year Held Valid Applications
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
50.34
50.34
50.34
50.34
50.34
43.82
43.82
43.82
43.82
43.82
32.61
32.61
32.61
32.61
32.61
21.63
21.63
21.63
21.63
21.63
27.54
27.54
27.54
27.54
27.54
27.54
27.54
27.54
27.54
27.54
30.54
30.54
30.54
31.58
27.69
80208
81365
87219
87603
89752
89554
79740
67006
56558
56643
58117
62599
65324
66874
64093
60863
52339
45549
45493
54190
67846
81056
75443
68740
67592
67264
60438
64554
72284
77185
77188
74906
74197
77495
78594
% of Patents Patent
Year Held Valid Applications
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
36.84
50
49.15
36.36
23.88
42.86
26.67
31.75
36.62
26.83
32.08
35.48
30.77
43.9
31.71
24
38.71
39.53
42.86
21.15
33.33
37.93
53.57
63.04
77.42
75.93
72.31
68.92
61.54
70.59
64.86
65.22
57.69
55.56
79590
83100
86029
85869
87592
94629
88525
85697
93471
98750
103175
104729
99298
104079
102538
101014
102344
100931
100916
100494
104329
106413
109625
103703
111284
117006
122433
127917
139825
152750
164558
164306
173075
189857
1999]
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Table 3
Percent Change in Patent Applications and Percent Change in GDP
% Change % Change
in Real in Patent
Year GDP Applications
1960 2.2 1.26727
1961 2.1 4.4101
1962 6 3.52466
1963 4.3 -0.18598
1964 5.8 2.00654
1965 6.4 8.03383
1966 6.4 -6.45045
1967 2.6 -3.19457
1968 4.7 9.07149
1969 3 5.64774
1970 0 4.48101
1971 3.3 1.50617
1972 5.4 -5.18576
1973 5.7 4.81479
1974 -0.4 -1.4806
1975 -0.6 -1.48627
1976 5.6 1.31664
1977 4.9 -1.38063
1978 5 -0.01486
1979 2.9 -0.41816
1980 -0.3 3.81614
1981 2.5 1.99752
1982 -2.1 3.01842
1983 4 -5.40205
1984 6.8 7.31029
1985 3.7 5.14179
1986 3 4.63822
1987 2.9 4.47918
1988 3.8 9.30916
1989 3.4 9.24369
1990 1.3 7.73027
1991 -1 -0.15313
1992 2.7 5.33699
1993 2.3 9.69637
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Table 4
Percent of Patents Held Valid, Percent Change in Real GDP and
Percent Change in Patent Applications
% of Patents % Change % Change in
Year Held Valid in Real GDP Patent Applications
1960 36.84 2.2 1.26727
1961 50 2.1 4.4101
1962 49.15 6 3.52466
1963 36.36 4.3 -0.18598
1964 23.88 5.8 2.00654
1965 42.86 6.4 8.03383
1966 26.67 6.4 -6.45045
1967 31.75 2.6 -3.19457
1968 36.62 4.7 9.07149
1969 26.83 3 5.64774
1970 32.08 0 4.48101
1971 35.48 3.3 1.50617
1972 30.77 5.4 -5.18576
1973 43.9 5.7 4.81479
1974 31.71 -0.4 -1.4806
1975 24 -0.6 -1.48627
1976 38.71 5.6 1.31664
1977 39.53 4.9 -1.38063
1978 42.86 5 -0.01486
1979 21.15 2.9 -0.41816
1980 33.33 -0.3 3.81614
1981 37.93 2.5 1.99752
1982 53.57 -2.1 3.01842
1983 63.04 4 -5.40205
1984 77.42 6.8 7.31029
1985 75.93 3.7 5.14179
1986 72.31 3 4.63822
1987 68.92 2.9 4.47918
1988 61.54 3.8 9.30916
1989 70.59 3.4 9.24369
1990 64.86 1.3 7.73027
1991 65.22 -1 -0.15313
1992 57.69 2.7 5.33699
1993 55.56 2.3 9.69637
1999]
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Table 5
Correlations
Rank Correlation:
T Test:
Pearson's:
T Test:
Rank Correlation:
T Test:
Pearson's:
T Test:
The Correlation Between
Percent of Patents Held Valid
And Patent Applications
0.660
5.044
0.646
4.861
The Correlations Between
Patent Applications and GDP
0.944
16.387
0.887
11.042
The Correlations Between
Rank Correlation:
T Test:
Pearson's:
T Test:
% of Patents
Held Valid and
Patent Applications
0.660
5.044
0.646
4.861
Patent
Applications
and GDP
0.944
16.387
0.887
11.042
% of Patents
Held Valid
and GDP
0.646
4.859
0.694
5.532
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